EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issue 93European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
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Page 26
... regulatory failure and certain well - known problems of public ownership , as in the following table ( Majone and La Spina 1992 : 261 ) . Failures of Economic Regulation Capture by regulated firms Overcapitalization ( 26.
... regulatory failure and certain well - known problems of public ownership , as in the following table ( Majone and La Spina 1992 : 261 ) . Failures of Economic Regulation Capture by regulated firms Overcapitalization ( 26.
Page 27
SPS. Failures of Economic Regulation Capture by regulated firms Overcapitalization ( Averch- Johnson effect ) Anticompetitive regulation Vague objectives ( " regulate in the public interest " ) Poor coordination among different ...
SPS. Failures of Economic Regulation Capture by regulated firms Overcapitalization ( Averch- Johnson effect ) Anticompetitive regulation Vague objectives ( " regulate in the public interest " ) Poor coordination among different ...
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency decisions agency theory American Experience asymmetrically distributed Author Title Autorités Administratives Indépendantes Baldwin and McCrudden branch of government budget budgetary Bundeskartellamt bureaucratic discretion capture Cass Sunstein competition control problem Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies coordination cost-benefit costs courts direct-expenditure EC regulations enforcement EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute Federal Republic Federal Trade Commission function Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD Hence important regulatory independent agencies independent fourth branch independent regulatory commissions interest IRCS Jean BLONDEL judicial review large number legislative Mayntz McCrudden 1987 minister ministerial monopolies national regulations nationalized industries non-majoritarian institutions Policy-Making political accountability political control political executives political principals Political Science presidential control privatization problem of political procedural Public Choice regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory agencies regulatory policy responsive role rule Scharpf separation of powers Shapiro social regulation Sunstein traditional Veljanovski 1991 Wood and Waterman Yandle