EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issue 93European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
From inside the book
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Page 10
... agencies mentioned above or does it extend more generally ? In the remainder of this paper I shall argue that in ... regulatory agencies require more complex systems of control than central administrative offices . This distinction is ...
... agencies mentioned above or does it extend more generally ? In the remainder of this paper I shall argue that in ... regulatory agencies require more complex systems of control than central administrative offices . This distinction is ...
Page 13
... regulatory agencies with overlapping responsibilities . Finally , the president is able not only to coordinate , but also to direct regulatory policy in a way that would be difficult or impossible if that policy were set individually by ...
... regulatory agencies with overlapping responsibilities . Finally , the president is able not only to coordinate , but also to direct regulatory policy in a way that would be difficult or impossible if that policy were set individually by ...
Page 17
... regulatory agencies are created by congressionally enacted statutes . The programs they operate are created , defined and limited by such statutes . Hence , even though such agencies are responsible to the president as head of the ...
... regulatory agencies are created by congressionally enacted statutes . The programs they operate are created , defined and limited by such statutes . Hence , even though such agencies are responsible to the president as head of the ...
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency decisions agency theory American Experience asymmetrically distributed Author Title Autorités Administratives Indépendantes Baldwin and McCrudden branch of government budget budgetary Bundeskartellamt bureaucratic discretion capture Cass Sunstein competition control problem Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies coordination cost-benefit costs courts direct-expenditure EC regulations enforcement EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute Federal Republic Federal Trade Commission function Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD Hence important regulatory independent agencies independent fourth branch independent regulatory commissions interest IRCS Jean BLONDEL judicial review large number legislative Mayntz McCrudden 1987 minister ministerial monopolies national regulations nationalized industries non-majoritarian institutions Policy-Making political accountability political control political executives political principals Political Science presidential control privatization problem of political procedural Public Choice regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory agencies regulatory policy responsive role rule Scharpf separation of powers Shapiro social regulation Sunstein traditional Veljanovski 1991 Wood and Waterman Yandle