EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issue 93European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
From inside the book
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Page 9
... responsive , at least in the period examined . The data indicate that among the tools of political control , the power to appoint is the most effective and most frequently used : in five of the seven cases examined , agency outputs ...
... responsive , at least in the period examined . The data indicate that among the tools of political control , the power to appoint is the most effective and most frequently used : in five of the seven cases examined , agency outputs ...
Page 10
... responsiveness and stability can roughly be arrayed along a continuum which aligns nicely with certain bureaucratic attributes . The agencies most responsive to executive influence , gauged by the magnitude and duration of change , were ...
... responsiveness and stability can roughly be arrayed along a continuum which aligns nicely with certain bureaucratic attributes . The agencies most responsive to executive influence , gauged by the magnitude and duration of change , were ...
Page 21
... responsive , in varying degrees , to the wishes of their political principals , and especially to those of the ... responsiveness to 21.
... responsive , in varying degrees , to the wishes of their political principals , and especially to those of the ... responsiveness to 21.
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency decisions agency theory American Experience asymmetrically distributed Author Title Autorités Administratives Indépendantes Baldwin and McCrudden branch of government budget budgetary Bundeskartellamt bureaucratic discretion capture Cass Sunstein competition control problem Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies coordination cost-benefit costs courts direct-expenditure EC regulations enforcement EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute Federal Republic Federal Trade Commission function Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD Hence important regulatory independent agencies independent fourth branch independent regulatory commissions interest IRCS Jean BLONDEL judicial review large number legislative Mayntz McCrudden 1987 minister ministerial monopolies national regulations nationalized industries non-majoritarian institutions Policy-Making political accountability political control political executives political principals Political Science presidential control privatization problem of political procedural Public Choice regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory agencies regulatory policy responsive role rule Scharpf separation of powers Shapiro social regulation Sunstein traditional Veljanovski 1991 Wood and Waterman Yandle