The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value
Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Less attention, however, has been paid as to why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. Richard Rowland argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. He shows that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, uninformative, and at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. In addition, he extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties and concepts, such as fittingness and 'ought', in terms of reasons.
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ABPM accept BPA according account of morality account of reasons account of value admire the demon agent-relative value amends analysed in terms argued argument attitudes BPGF BPGK buck-passing account claim concept or property Conditionality of Reasons Consequentialism about Reasons consequentialist Counterfactual BPA Dancy demon will punish deontological Derek Parfit doomsday machine entails the falsity epistemic reasons final value fittingness h-ing hold instance Jonathan Dancy kind of reasons morally wrong motivating reasons Non-Derivative Reason non-instrumental pro-attitudes normative ethics normative reasons notion objection occurrent beliefs p-ing pro-attitude in response Provides No Non-Derivative PRs & Evidence rational agents reason to admire reason to desire reason to reject reason to want reasons and value reasons for action reasons for belief reasons for pro-attitudes reasons in terms reasons to accept saucer of mud seems serial killer Sfor Solitary sufficient reason terms of reasons thick evaluative things equal Williams's internalism wrong kind