fested alike by the highest and the lowest animals, to those exceedingly complex and heterogeneous sets of correspondences known as reason and volition, which are manifested only by the highest animals, and in their greatest complexity by man alone. Throughout this wonderful process we have seen how closely the evolution of psychical function is correlated with the evolution of nerve structure. But, great as has been our gain during the foregoing exposition, our theory of psychical evolution is as yet by no means complete. Concerning the relations of Mind to Life, and concerning the Composition and Evolution of Mind in general, we have obtained many valuable results. But nothing has as yet been said concerning the especial mode of genesis of those highest manifestations of thought and feeling which distinguish civilized man. This problem must be duly treated before our account of psychical evolution can be regarded as complete even in outline. Upon questions of this sort, however, we are not yet prepared to enter. Those highest manifestations of thought and feeling which distinguish civilized man from inferior mammals, and in a lessmarked degree from uncivilized man, are the products of countless ages of social evolution; and before we can hope to understand their mode of genesis, we must see what are the teachings of history and psychology concerning the character of social evolution in general. Having shown how, starting from a relatively low degree of sociality, a relatively high degree is attained in conformity to the general theory of Life as Adjustment, we shall be better enabled to comprehend the genesis of that lowest degree of sociality, the attainment of which was the decisive step which first raised Man above the level of the Brutes. The four following chapters will therefore be concerned with Sociology; and the first will be devoted to clearing away a complicated misunderstanding, by the help of which metaphysicians have long sought, and still seek, to deter us from applying scientific methods of interpretation to the phenomena of human history.

CHAPTER XVII.

SOCIOLOGY AND FREE-WILL.

THAT the phenomena manifested by human beings, as grouped in societies, conform to fixed and ascertainable laws, is a proposition which has thus far been taken for granted, inasmuch as it is logically inseparable from the other sets of propositions which go to make up our Cosmic Philosophy. Not only, moreover, have we thus tacitly assumed that social phenomena conform to law and may be made the subject of science, but in the fourth chapter of this Synthesis it was expressly stated that the fundamental law to which they conform is the Law of Evolution, which has now been proved to hold sway among inorganic and organic phenomena, as well as among those super-organic phenomena which we distinguish as psychical. Under ordinary circumstances we might fairly go on and justify our tacit assumption and our explicit assertion, by showing, both deductively and inductively, that the evolution of society follows in general the same method as the evolution of organic life. In the following chapter I shall proceed to do this. I shall show, first, that social evolution consists in the integration of human families or tribal communities into larger and larger groups, which become ever more heterogeneous and more interdependent; and secondly, that what we call civilization consists in the ever increasing definiteness and complexity of the correspondence between the community

and the environment. Thirdly, I shall carry on the inquiry to a point somewhat in advance of Mr. Spencer's exposition, as it now stands, and show how these truths must be supplemented in order to give us a law of social evolution which shall cover social phenomena simply, excluding the more general phenomena of organic life.

But while under ordinary circumstances it might be well enough to proceed directly to such an investigation, since there is no better way of proving that certain groups of phenomena conform to law than by pointing out the law to which they conform, nevertheless in the present case I think it desirable to preface the inquiry with a brief discussion of one or two logical and psychological truths-truths of method and of doctrine-which lie at the basis of sociology. In our survey of the simpler sciences, no such preface was called for. In beginning to treat of biological truths, we did not deem it necessary to prove that waste and repair proceed according to immutable laws, or to forestall possible cavils by declaring that, although we cannot predict our states of health from week to week, nevertheless organic phenomena are not the sport of chance. It is otherwise in sociology, which is a new science, encumbered with many popular misconceptions, and regarded with an evil eye by theologians,-persons who profess great devotion to the interests of advancing knowledge in general, while the particular advance in knowledge at any time going on somehow never happens to be the one which. they think fit to regard with favour. Of each new trophy which Science has from time to time laboriously won, these opponents have hastened to declare, "Behold it is the last!" Though the phenomena presented by the heavenly bodies, by the surface of the earth, and by the life which covers the earth, have one after another, in spite of vehement theological protest, been made the subjects of science, it is still stoutly

1 "Als Pythagoras seinen berühmten Lehrsatz entdeckte, opferte er den Göttern eine Hekatombe, d. h. ein Opfer von hundert Stieren. Seitdem

maintained that the results of human volitions can never become amenable to scientific treatment. Here, it is cried, on the threshold of sociology we must take our final stand, and insist, in the interests of religion and morality, that although all other events may occur in regular sequence, nevertheless in human affairs there is no such sequence. The arguments by which it is sought to establish this desperate proposition, are based partly on those facts which are assumed to prove the freedom of the will, partly on the endless diversity and complexity of human affairs. Concerning this latter class of considerations, I may say here that they are at once irrelevant and inconclusive. Irrelevant, since even if it were to be granted-which it is not-that the extreme intricacy of social phenomena may prevent our discerning the order of their sequence, this would prove, not that there is no sequence, but that our vision is limited. Inconclusive, because from the nature of the case, other things being equal, complex phenomena cannot be generalized until the simpler phenomena which they involve have been mentally reduced to orderly succession. As we shall again have occasion to notice, the laws of social life could not be discovered until the sciences of biology and psychology had gone far toward formulating the laws of physical and psychical life in general. But the misconceptions which cluster about this subject are so numerous that they may best be eliminated by a somewhat detailed controversy. Let us examine the argument from complexity, as presented by Mr. Froude; and afterwards the argument from the assumed lawlessness of volition, as presented by Mr. Goldwin Smith.

1

Mr. Froude begins by dogmatically denying that there is or can be such a thing as a science of history. There is something incongruous, he says, in the very connection of

brüllen alle Ochsen, so oft eine neue Wahrheit entdeckt wird.”- Büchner, Die Darwin'sche Theorie, p. 288.

A Short Studies on Great Subjects, vol. i.

the two words. "It is as if we were to talk of the colour of sound, or the longitude of the rule-of-three." But he carries on the thought in a way that shows plainly his reluctance to grapple fairly with the problem. In his next sentence he says, "where it is so difficult to make out the truth on the commonest disputed facts in matters passing under our very eyes, how can we talk of a science in things long past, which come to us only through books?" Now to reason like this, is merely to shrink from the encounter. For the question is, not whether the science is difficult, but whether it is possible. Mr. Froude sets out to show that there can be no such science, and his first bit of proof is that, if there is such a science, it must be far more difficult than any other; a position which we may contentedly grant. Let us follow him a step farther. "It often seems to me as if history were like a child's box of letters, with which we can spell any word we please. We have only to pick out such letters as we want, arrange them as we like, and say nothing about those which do not suit our purpose." And what does all this amount to? Is this Mr. Froude's idea of historical investigation? Why, the same thing may be done in any science. We have only to pick out all the facts on one side, and blink all the facts on the other side to prove the veracity of every oracle, soothsayer, and clairvoyant that ever existed, the validity of every paltry omen, the credibility of every crazy notion of alchemy or judicial astrology. In this way we may prove that the homoeopathist always saves his patient, while the allopathist always kills him; or vice versa. And it was in this way that the phrenologists erected their pseudoscience. By following this method, also, it becomes easy to prove that Henry VIII. was an exemplary husband. It is in this way that every incorrect or inadequate hypothesis in physical science in history has arisen and gained temporary recognition. S ing Tycho Brahe had said to his Coperican antagoni

tronomy is like a child's box of letters;