EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 16
SPS. constraint , regulation turned out to be the most effective way for the Commission to maximize its influence . Moreover , by denying the Commission any significant role in implementation the member states have encouraged a tendency ...
SPS. constraint , regulation turned out to be the most effective way for the Commission to maximize its influence . Moreover , by denying the Commission any significant role in implementation the member states have encouraged a tendency ...
Page 17
... Commission by providing partial compensation for its exclusion from the implementation process . Also the labyrinthine system of committees of national experts , created to assist the Commission and at the same time to limit its ...
... Commission by providing partial compensation for its exclusion from the implementation process . Also the labyrinthine system of committees of national experts , created to assist the Commission and at the same time to limit its ...
Page 25
... Commission's freedom and even less that it has been set up to assure the Member States ' control " ( Institut für ... Commission's original proposals ( ib . , p.123 ) . In fact , the Council cannot compete with the expertise at the ...
... Commission's freedom and even less that it has been set up to assure the Member States ' control " ( Institut für ... Commission's original proposals ( ib . , p.123 ) . In fact , the Council cannot compete with the expertise at the ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson