EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 15
... rules are negligible . The structural difference between regulatory policies and policies involving the direct expenditure of public funds is especially important for the analysis of EC policy making since not only the financial , but ...
... rules are negligible . The structural difference between regulatory policies and policies involving the direct expenditure of public funds is especially important for the analysis of EC policy making since not only the financial , but ...
Page 22
... EC policy making can learn a great deal from recent theories on the governance of contractual relations . 5. The European Commission as policy entrepreneur The argument developed so far may be summarized by saying that , in order to ...
... EC policy making can learn a great deal from recent theories on the governance of contractual relations . 5. The European Commission as policy entrepreneur The argument developed so far may be summarized by saying that , in order to ...
Page 27
... policy innovations in the EC have been achieved after many years during which the Commission persisted in its attempts to " soften up " the opposition of the member states , while waiting for a window of opportunity to open . A textbook ...
... policy innovations in the EC have been achieved after many years during which the Commission persisted in its attempts to " soften up " the opposition of the member states , while waiting for a window of opportunity to open . A textbook ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson