EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 10
Page 3
... hence the question about the willingness of the member states to delegate should be given an answer which takes the specific features of the EC system into account . Among these features is the fact that centralization has occurred in ...
... hence the question about the willingness of the member states to delegate should be given an answer which takes the specific features of the EC system into account . Among these features is the fact that centralization has occurred in ...
Page 11
SPS. much harder for outsiders to monitor . Hence the suspicion of the other member states that the U.K.'s preference for environmental ... Hence the transfer of regulatory powers to a supranational authority like the European Commission , ...
SPS. much harder for outsiders to monitor . Hence the suspicion of the other member states that the U.K.'s preference for environmental ... Hence the transfer of regulatory powers to a supranational authority like the European Commission , ...
Page 21
... Hence inflexible agreements are an efficient method of contractual governance only for relatively simple , once- for - all transactions such as the so - called spot - market contracts . A more promising response to contractual ...
... Hence inflexible agreements are an efficient method of contractual governance only for relatively simple , once- for - all transactions such as the so - called spot - market contracts . A more promising response to contractual ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson