EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 9
Page 13
... agency that had raised objections . -- The procedure did not work well . Actual decision times were much longer than those prescribed by the 1975 Directive , and national regulators did not appear to be bound either by decisions of ...
... agency that had raised objections . -- The procedure did not work well . Actual decision times were much longer than those prescribed by the 1975 Directive , and national regulators did not appear to be bound either by decisions of ...
Page 37
... agencies often are dependent on prior decisions of the minister laying down the principles to be applied . But the credibility of regulators will continue to remain low as long as agency autonomy can be disregarded with impunity in the ...
... agencies often are dependent on prior decisions of the minister laying down the principles to be applied . But the credibility of regulators will continue to remain low as long as agency autonomy can be disregarded with impunity in the ...
Page 40
... agency rivalry , can all be elements of a pervasive but flexible system of control . When the system works properly no one controls an independent agency , yet the agency is " under control " . References Coase , Ronald , 1960 : " The ...
... agency rivalry , can all be elements of a pervasive but flexible system of control . When the system works properly no one controls an independent agency , yet the agency is " under control " . References Coase , Ronald , 1960 : " The ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson