EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 10
... agreements as was done , for example , in case of the Agreement on social policy concluded between the member states , with the exception of the United Kingdom , and annexed to the Maastricht Treaty ( Vogel - Polsky , 1994 ) . Coase ...
... agreements as was done , for example , in case of the Agreement on social policy concluded between the member states , with the exception of the United Kingdom , and annexed to the Maastricht Treaty ( Vogel - Polsky , 1994 ) . Coase ...
Page 11
... agreement , the agreement is not credible . Sometimes member states have problems of credibility not just in the eyes of each other but also in the eyes of third parties , such as regulated firms or governments outside the Union . For ...
... agreement , the agreement is not credible . Sometimes member states have problems of credibility not just in the eyes of each other but also in the eyes of third parties , such as regulated firms or governments outside the Union . For ...
Page 21
... agreement . Such requirements are never satisfied in actual contracting because of a combination of factors : bounded rationality , opportunistic behaviour ( including the possibility of reneging ) and imperfect commitments . One ...
... agreement . Such requirements are never satisfied in actual contracting because of a combination of factors : bounded rationality , opportunistic behaviour ( including the possibility of reneging ) and imperfect commitments . One ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson