EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 15
... budget constraint . By national standards , the Community budget is quite small : less than 1.3 per cent of the gross domestic product of the Union or about 4 per cent of the combined expenditures of the central governments of the ...
... budget constraint . By national standards , the Community budget is quite small : less than 1.3 per cent of the gross domestic product of the Union or about 4 per cent of the combined expenditures of the central governments of the ...
Page 23
... budget as an effective tool of control . As Wildavsky ( 1964 ) discovered , budgeting is decentralized and incremental , resulting in automatic increases that further insulate the bureaucracy from political control . Theories based on ...
... budget as an effective tool of control . As Wildavsky ( 1964 ) discovered , budgeting is decentralized and incremental , resulting in automatic increases that further insulate the bureaucracy from political control . Theories based on ...
Page 40
... budget " , professionalism and expertise , monitoring by interest groups , even inter - agency rivalry , can all be elements of a pervasive but flexible system of control . When the system works properly no one controls an independent ...
... budget " , professionalism and expertise , monitoring by interest groups , even inter - agency rivalry , can all be elements of a pervasive but flexible system of control . When the system works properly no one controls an independent ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson