EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 17
... committees of national experts , created to assist the Commission and at the same time to limit its discretion , favours regulatory complexity by introducing a strong technical bias into the Community regulatory process . In many cases ...
... committees of national experts , created to assist the Commission and at the same time to limit its discretion , favours regulatory complexity by introducing a strong technical bias into the Community regulatory process . In many cases ...
Page 24
... committees created under this system can block a Commission measure and transmit the case to the Council , which can overrule the Commission . Even in the case of such committees , however , the Commission is not only in the chair , but ...
... committees created under this system can block a Commission measure and transmit the case to the Council , which can overrule the Commission . Even in the case of such committees , however , the Commission is not only in the chair , but ...
Page 25
... committee significantly reduced the Commission's freedom and even less that it has been set up to assure the Member ... committees , but when it does , its decisions mostly support the Commission's original proposals ( ib . , p.123 ) ...
... committee significantly reduced the Commission's freedom and even less that it has been set up to assure the Member ... committees , but when it does , its decisions mostly support the Commission's original proposals ( ib . , p.123 ) ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson