EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 4
... contractual partners . This analysis complements that of public - choice theorists , with the added advantage of providing a coherent intellectual basis for normative proposals . 1. Policy externalities and the dilemma of regulatory ...
... contractual partners . This analysis complements that of public - choice theorists , with the added advantage of providing a coherent intellectual basis for normative proposals . 1. Policy externalities and the dilemma of regulatory ...
Page 20
... contractual partners have their own private interests , which are rarely aligned with the interests of other partners or of the organization to which the partners belong . Because of this misalignment , contractual partners do not act ...
... contractual partners have their own private interests , which are rarely aligned with the interests of other partners or of the organization to which the partners belong . Because of this misalignment , contractual partners do not act ...
Page 34
... contracting stage . As Williamson , quoting I.R.MacNeil , writes , the fiction of the discreetness of the ex ante and ex post stages must be abandoned as the relation among contractual partners takes on the characteristics of a ...
... contracting stage . As Williamson , quoting I.R.MacNeil , writes , the fiction of the discreetness of the ex ante and ex post stages must be abandoned as the relation among contractual partners takes on the characteristics of a ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson