EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 6
... deal of empirical evidence ; but it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that centralization is , if not an optimal at least a second - best solution . Under present institutional arrangements neither further centralization nor ...
... deal of empirical evidence ; but it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that centralization is , if not an optimal at least a second - best solution . Under present institutional arrangements neither further centralization nor ...
Page 8
... deal with , to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms , to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain , to draw up the contract , to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are ...
... deal with , to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms , to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain , to draw up the contract , to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are ...
Page 24
... deal with agents they once selected , and in these dealings the bureaucrats have an advantage in technical and operational expertise . As a result , they are increasingly able to pursue their objective of greater autonomy . As Terry Moe ...
... deal with agents they once selected , and in these dealings the bureaucrats have an advantage in technical and operational expertise . As a result , they are increasingly able to pursue their objective of greater autonomy . As Terry Moe ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson