EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 2
... decisions in the EC is determined by the preferences of the least forthcoming government . Hence , barring special ... decision of governments to delegate policy - making powers , in a given sector , to a supranational institution ...
... decisions in the EC is determined by the preferences of the least forthcoming government . Hence , barring special ... decision of governments to delegate policy - making powers , in a given sector , to a supranational institution ...
Page 35
SPS. responsibility , as well as the requisite authority , for ensuring that joint decisions are effectively implemented . Member states are beginning to realize that non - compliance threatens the credibility of their collective decisions ...
SPS. responsibility , as well as the requisite authority , for ensuring that joint decisions are effectively implemented . Member states are beginning to realize that non - compliance threatens the credibility of their collective decisions ...
Page 39
... decision . Again , competition policy , including the control of mergers and of anti - competitive state aid ... decisions , as the German government does in the case of some Bundeskartellamt's rulings . But the political costs ...
... decision . Again , competition policy , including the control of mergers and of anti - competitive state aid ... decisions , as the German government does in the case of some Bundeskartellamt's rulings . But the political costs ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson