EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 10
... difficult for the parties concerned to know whether or not an agreement is properly kept . Policing , enforcement ... difficulty of monitoring pollution , but also because of problems related to regulatory discretion and imperfect ...
... difficult for the parties concerned to know whether or not an agreement is properly kept . Policing , enforcement ... difficulty of monitoring pollution , but also because of problems related to regulatory discretion and imperfect ...
Page 11
... difficult for an outside observer to determine whether the spirit , or only the letter , of an international regulation has been violated . When it is difficult to observe whether national governments are making an honest effort to ...
... difficult for an outside observer to determine whether the spirit , or only the letter , of an international regulation has been violated . When it is difficult to observe whether national governments are making an honest effort to ...
Page 38
... difficult to achieve in the future . The European Commission should take the lead in facilitating and coordinating the work of EU regulatory networks , and in ensuring that their activities are consistent with European objectives . The ...
... difficult to achieve in the future . The European Commission should take the lead in facilitating and coordinating the work of EU regulatory networks , and in ensuring that their activities are consistent with European objectives . The ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson