EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 17
... experts , created to assist the Commission and at the same time to limit its discretion , favours regulatory complexity by introducing a strong technical bias into the Community regulatory process . In many cases , national experts have ...
... experts , created to assist the Commission and at the same time to limit its discretion , favours regulatory complexity by introducing a strong technical bias into the Community regulatory process . In many cases , national experts have ...
Page 18
... experts . Unlike other interest groups , these experts care more about the process than the outcome of regulation . They have an interest in regulatory complexity because complexity increases the value of their expertise . Thus " red ...
... experts . Unlike other interest groups , these experts care more about the process than the outcome of regulation . They have an interest in regulatory complexity because complexity increases the value of their expertise . Thus " red ...
Page 25
... experts from the national administrations , independent experts , academics , consumer and other public - interest advocates , and representatives of economic interests , professional organizations and sub - national governments ...
... experts from the national administrations , independent experts , academics , consumer and other public - interest advocates , and representatives of economic interests , professional organizations and sub - national governments ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson