EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 5
... externalities ( positive as well as negative ) are created by the actions of national regulators , and it is with such " policy externalities " that this paper is concerned . Notice that internationally relevant policy externalities can ...
... externalities ( positive as well as negative ) are created by the actions of national regulators , and it is with such " policy externalities " that this paper is concerned . Notice that internationally relevant policy externalities can ...
Page 6
... externalities , and perhaps capture economies of scale in policy making . But its cost is the homogenization of policy across jurisdictions that may be dissimilar with respect to underlying tastes or needs . -- There is no easy way of ...
... externalities , and perhaps capture economies of scale in policy making . But its cost is the homogenization of policy across jurisdictions that may be dissimilar with respect to underlying tastes or needs . -- There is no easy way of ...
Page 7
SPS. 2. From negative externalities to transaction costs We know from Coase theorem ( Coase , 1960 ) that it is not externalities as such that constitute a problem for collective action , but positive transaction costs and imperfect ...
SPS. 2. From negative externalities to transaction costs We know from Coase theorem ( Coase , 1960 ) that it is not externalities as such that constitute a problem for collective action , but positive transaction costs and imperfect ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson