EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 7
... greater than the benefits , the externality persists but is shown , ipso facto , to be a Pareto - irrelevant one . The same argument , together with the usual assumptions of self- interested behaviour and bounded rationality , can be ...
... greater than the benefits , the externality persists but is shown , ipso facto , to be a Pareto - irrelevant one . The same argument , together with the usual assumptions of self- interested behaviour and bounded rationality , can be ...
Page 24
... greater autonomy . As Terry Moe ( 1990 , p.143 ) writes : Once an agency is created , the political world becomes a different place . Agency bureaucrats are now political actors in their own right : they have career and institutional ...
... greater autonomy . As Terry Moe ( 1990 , p.143 ) writes : Once an agency is created , the political world becomes a different place . Agency bureaucrats are now political actors in their own right : they have career and institutional ...
Page 36
SPS. saw , are more centralization and greater uniformity of norms than is necessary for market integration . Under the present institutional arrangements , however , a plea for more decentralization and greater normative flexibility is ...
SPS. saw , are more centralization and greater uniformity of norms than is necessary for market integration . Under the present institutional arrangements , however , a plea for more decentralization and greater normative flexibility is ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson