EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 4
... increase the costs of transacting and prevent a satisfactory alignment of the interests of the various contractual ... increasing complexity of technology and society and the growing interdependence of national economies create a variety ...
... increase the costs of transacting and prevent a satisfactory alignment of the interests of the various contractual ... increasing complexity of technology and society and the growing interdependence of national economies create a variety ...
Page 16
... increase the legitimacy of the Commission , it also contributes to the apparently unstoppable growth of EC regulation . Also the phenomenon of regulatory complexity may be usefully analyzed from the perspective suggested here . Many ...
... increase the legitimacy of the Commission , it also contributes to the apparently unstoppable growth of EC regulation . Also the phenomenon of regulatory complexity may be usefully analyzed from the perspective suggested here . Many ...
Page 23
... increase the probability of re - election than with overseeing the bureaucracy . As a result , they do not typically ... increases that further insulate the bureaucracy from political control . Theories based on the principal - agent ...
... increase the probability of re - election than with overseeing the bureaucracy . As a result , they do not typically ... increases that further insulate the bureaucracy from political control . Theories based on the principal - agent ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson