EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 5
Page 36
... Independence changes the motivation of regulators whose reputation now depends more on their ability to achieve the objectives assigned to their agencies than on their political skills . With independence , a problem - solving style of ...
... Independence changes the motivation of regulators whose reputation now depends more on their ability to achieve the objectives assigned to their agencies than on their political skills . With independence , a problem - solving style of ...
Page 37
... independence professionalism , accountability by results , freedom from party political influence , greater policy ... independence of regulatory agencies , just as they respect the independence of the courts . In the meantime , measures ...
... independence professionalism , accountability by results , freedom from party political influence , greater policy ... independence of regulatory agencies , just as they respect the independence of the courts . In the meantime , measures ...
Page 40
... independence and accountability can be complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than antithetical values . What is required to reconcile independence and accountability are richer and more flexible forms of control than the ...
... independence and accountability can be complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than antithetical values . What is required to reconcile independence and accountability are richer and more flexible forms of control than the ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson