EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 4
... mistrust and imperfect commitments , which increase the costs of transacting and prevent a satisfactory alignment of the interests of the various contractual partners . This analysis complements that of public - choice theorists , with ...
... mistrust and imperfect commitments , which increase the costs of transacting and prevent a satisfactory alignment of the interests of the various contractual partners . This analysis complements that of public - choice theorists , with ...
Page 12
... mistrust The costs of organizing , implementing and monitoring collective decisions are greatly increased if the parties to the agreement do not trust each other . In this section I argue that the mistrust of the member states toward ...
... mistrust The costs of organizing , implementing and monitoring collective decisions are greatly increased if the parties to the agreement do not trust each other . In this section I argue that the mistrust of the member states toward ...
Page 14
... mistrust each other ; they also mistrust European institutions . This attitude has significant , if paradoxical , consequences both for the quantitative growth of Community regulations and for the poor level of their enforcement . One ...
... mistrust each other ; they also mistrust European institutions . This attitude has significant , if paradoxical , consequences both for the quantitative growth of Community regulations and for the poor level of their enforcement . One ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson