EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 10
... monitor , the UK preferred to set environmental quality standards . Such standards are more sensitive to the different environmental circumstances of different countries but are also much harder for outsiders to monitor . Hence the ...
... monitor , the UK preferred to set environmental quality standards . Such standards are more sensitive to the different environmental circumstances of different countries but are also much harder for outsiders to monitor . Hence the ...
Page 11
SPS. much harder for outsiders to monitor . Hence the suspicion of the other member states that the U.K.'s preference for environmental quality standards was in fact due to an underlying unwillingness to implement its share of the ...
SPS. much harder for outsiders to monitor . Hence the suspicion of the other member states that the U.K.'s preference for environmental quality standards was in fact due to an underlying unwillingness to implement its share of the ...
Page 19
... monitor and enforce . Another class contains similarly precise goals within specified actors or areas but leaves a large element of discretion to Member States in determining where they are to apply " . Moreover , what is actually ...
... monitor and enforce . Another class contains similarly precise goals within specified actors or areas but leaves a large element of discretion to Member States in determining where they are to apply " . Moreover , what is actually ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson