EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 20
... motivation problem of collective action . Motivation questions arise because contractual partners have their own private interests , which are rarely aligned with the interests of other partners or of the organization to which the ...
... motivation problem of collective action . Motivation questions arise because contractual partners have their own private interests , which are rarely aligned with the interests of other partners or of the organization to which the ...
Page 36
... motivation of regulators whose reputation now depends more on their ability to achieve the objectives assigned to their agencies than on their political skills . With independence , a problem - solving style of policy making tends to ...
... motivation of regulators whose reputation now depends more on their ability to achieve the objectives assigned to their agencies than on their political skills . With independence , a problem - solving style of policy making tends to ...
Page 38
... motivated to resist political pressures . This is because the regulator has an incentive to maintain his or her reputation in the eyes of fellow regulators in other countries . A politically motivated decision would compromise his / her ...
... motivated to resist political pressures . This is because the regulator has an incentive to maintain his or her reputation in the eyes of fellow regulators in other countries . A politically motivated decision would compromise his / her ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson