EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 11
... national governments are making an honest effort to enforce a cooperative agreement , the agreement is not credible . Sometimes member states have problems of credibility not just in the eyes of each other but also in the eyes of third ...
... national governments are making an honest effort to enforce a cooperative agreement , the agreement is not credible . Sometimes member states have problems of credibility not just in the eyes of each other but also in the eyes of third ...
Page 25
... national governments . Commission officials engage in extensive discussions with all these actors but remain free to ... national level , increases the freedom of choice of European officials . It may even happen that national experts ...
... national governments . Commission officials engage in extensive discussions with all these actors but remain free to ... national level , increases the freedom of choice of European officials . It may even happen that national experts ...
Page 39
... national enforcement officers concerned with environmental law . The recent ... governments and from the Commission . Commissioners would still be able to ... national regulatory networks , like the " regional 39.
... national enforcement officers concerned with environmental law . The recent ... governments and from the Commission . Commissioners would still be able to ... national regulatory networks , like the " regional 39.
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson