EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 11
... regulators lack information that only regulated firms have and because ... national governments are making an honest effort to enforce a cooperative ... regulatory powers to a supranational authority like the European Commission , 11.
... regulators lack information that only regulated firms have and because ... national governments are making an honest effort to enforce a cooperative ... regulatory powers to a supranational authority like the European Commission , 11.
Page 13
... national regulators did not appear to be bound either by decisions of other regulatory bodies , or by the opinions ... national regulators continued to raise objections against each other almost routinely ( Kaufer , 1990 ) . These ...
... national regulators did not appear to be bound either by decisions of other regulatory bodies , or by the opinions ... national regulators continued to raise objections against each other almost routinely ( Kaufer , 1990 ) . These ...
Page 39
... regulation . In fact , at an informal meeting of the Council of Ministers in October 1991 , it was agreed that member states should establish an informal network of national enforcement officers concerned with environmental law . The ...
... regulation . In fact , at an informal meeting of the Council of Ministers in October 1991 , it was agreed that member states should establish an informal network of national enforcement officers concerned with environmental law . The ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson