EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 23
... political control . Theories based on the principal - agent model give a more positive assessment of the possibility of political control of the bureaucracy . According to agency theory , political control is possible because elected ...
... political control . Theories based on the principal - agent model give a more positive assessment of the possibility of political control of the bureaucracy . According to agency theory , political control is possible because elected ...
Page 24
... political game . This recent research on political - bureaucratic relations throws considerable light on the dynamics of delegation and control in the EC context . Also for the representatives of the member states in the Council of ...
... political game . This recent research on political - bureaucratic relations throws considerable light on the dynamics of delegation and control in the EC context . Also for the representatives of the member states in the Council of ...
Page 37
... political influences in the performance of their task ; they can no longer be players in the old game of pumping up the economy just before an election ( Nicoll , 1993 ) . -- The recent rise of independent regulatory agencies throughout ...
... political influences in the performance of their task ; they can no longer be players in the old game of pumping up the economy just before an election ( Nicoll , 1993 ) . -- The recent rise of independent regulatory agencies throughout ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson