EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 7
... powers to supranational or international bodies , or to harmonize their legislations . If national regulators were willing and able to take into account the external effects of their decisions ; if they were well- informed about one ...
... powers to supranational or international bodies , or to harmonize their legislations . If national regulators were willing and able to take into account the external effects of their decisions ; if they were well- informed about one ...
Page 22
... powers than would be required by efficiency considerations , one must consider also the motivation issue -- the imperfect alignment of national interests with the interests of the Union , and the transaction costs this entails . The ...
... powers than would be required by efficiency considerations , one must consider also the motivation issue -- the imperfect alignment of national interests with the interests of the Union , and the transaction costs this entails . The ...
Page 36
... powers to the supranational level , assigns sweeping powers to the European Central Bank ( ECB ) . The ECB can make regulations that are binding in their entirety and become European and member states ' law , without the involvement of ...
... powers to the supranational level , assigns sweeping powers to the European Central Bank ( ECB ) . The ECB can make regulations that are binding in their entirety and become European and member states ' law , without the involvement of ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson