EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 21
... relational contracting , which does not attempt the impossible task of complete contracting but instead settles for an agreement that frames the entire relationship . This mode of contractual governance recognizes that it is impossible ...
... relational contracting , which does not attempt the impossible task of complete contracting but instead settles for an agreement that frames the entire relationship . This mode of contractual governance recognizes that it is impossible ...
Page 22
... relational contracting the parties " do not agree on detailed plans of action but on goals and objectives , on general provisions that are broadly applicable , on the criteria to be used in deciding what to do when unforeseen ...
... relational contracting the parties " do not agree on detailed plans of action but on goals and objectives , on general provisions that are broadly applicable , on the criteria to be used in deciding what to do when unforeseen ...
Page 34
... relational contracting points in the same direction . As mentioned in section 4 , the starting point of the relational - contracting approach is the observation that it is impossible to concentrate all of the relevant bargaining action ...
... relational contracting points in the same direction . As mentioned in section 4 , the starting point of the relational - contracting approach is the observation that it is impossible to concentrate all of the relevant bargaining action ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson