EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 18
... rule complexity is a private interest that arises because a complex regulatory environment allows for specialization in various stages of rule making , as well as in " rule intermediation " ( Kearl , 1983 ; Quandt , 1983 ) . 4 ...
... rule complexity is a private interest that arises because a complex regulatory environment allows for specialization in various stages of rule making , as well as in " rule intermediation " ( Kearl , 1983 ; Quandt , 1983 ) . 4 ...
Page 31
... rule . The situation is very different at the European level . Here the redistributive function of government is severely limited by the small size of the budget , and the macroeconomic function almost non - existent ; redistributive ...
... rule . The situation is very different at the European level . Here the redistributive function of government is severely limited by the small size of the budget , and the macroeconomic function almost non - existent ; redistributive ...
Page 42
... Rules , Rules Intermediaries and the Complexity and Stability of Regulation " , Journal of Public Economics , 22 , pp.215-226 . Kingdon , John W. , 1984 : Agendas , Alternatives and Public Policy , Boston : Little , Brown . Kreps ...
... Rules , Rules Intermediaries and the Complexity and Stability of Regulation " , Journal of Public Economics , 22 , pp.215-226 . Kingdon , John W. , 1984 : Agendas , Alternatives and Public Policy , Boston : Little , Brown . Kreps ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson