EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 19
... suggests that these Community acts ( and perhaps also other instruments of the " soft law " variety ) may be usefully modeled as " incomplete contracts " between the European executive and the member states . The theory of 19.
... suggests that these Community acts ( and perhaps also other instruments of the " soft law " variety ) may be usefully modeled as " incomplete contracts " between the European executive and the member states . The theory of 19.
Page 30
SPS. suggests the possibility that the regulators become captured by the regulated interests . Finally , a policy may confer general ( though perhaps small ) benefits at a cost to be borne chiefly by a small segment of society . Most ...
SPS. suggests the possibility that the regulators become captured by the regulated interests . Finally , a policy may confer general ( though perhaps small ) benefits at a cost to be borne chiefly by a small segment of society . Most ...
Page 39
... suggests that not only national regulators but also their counterparts in the Commission should be independent . Although European commissioners are not supposed to pursue national interests , usually they are politicians who , after ...
... suggests that not only national regulators but also their counterparts in the Commission should be independent . Although European commissioners are not supposed to pursue national interests , usually they are politicians who , after ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson