EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1995 - Europe |
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Page 6
... cost is the homogenization of policy across jurisdictions that may be dissimilar with respect to underlying tastes or needs . -- There is no easy way ... transaction costs . 2. From negative externalities to transaction costs We know from 6.
... cost is the homogenization of policy across jurisdictions that may be dissimilar with respect to underlying tastes or needs . -- There is no easy way ... transaction costs . 2. From negative externalities to transaction costs We know from 6.
Page 7
... transaction costs and imperfect information . In a situation where transaction costs are zero and information is complete , affected parties can always bargain among themselves to reach an efficient solution : either the externality is ...
... transaction costs and imperfect information . In a situation where transaction costs are zero and information is complete , affected parties can always bargain among themselves to reach an efficient solution : either the externality is ...
Page 8
... transaction costs that arise in the formulation and implementation of international regulatory agreements . In Coase's definition , transaction costs are incurred in order " to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with , to inform ...
... transaction costs that arise in the formulation and implementation of international regulatory agreements . In Coase's definition , transaction costs are incurred in order " to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with , to inform ...
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Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title bargaining behaviour budget bureaucracy Coase Coase theorem comitology Commission officials committees contractual partners Council of Ministers countries Court credibility decisions Dehousse delegation dilemma of regulatory EC policy Economic Eichener enforcement EUI Working Paper Europe European Commission European Community European institutions European level European Union European University Institute expertise founding treaties Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety Hence Idem imperfect commitments implementation important independence Interest-group Politics intergovernmental agreement issues Jean BLONDEL legislation Maastricht Treaty Milgrom and Roberts mistrust monitor Motivational Factors mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators objectives policy entrepreneur policy externalities policy innovation political control problem Public regulatory complexity regulatory federalism regulatory powers relational contracting Single European Act single European market Social Dumping social policy social regulation social regulatory measures structure students of EC supranational institutions supranational level technical theory transaction costs University Press Wildavsky Williamson