elevating the multitude above a state of dependence, it shall annihilate the controlling influence of the few.

These remarks may seem to be uncalled for by any thing existing in our own country; but, we apprehend, there is room for a useful application of them even here. At all events, the subject deserves a more general and critical consideration than it has yet received, not only from political economists, but also, and more especially, from the community at large. Wealth is an instrument of such prodigious power,-capable of affecting so vari ously, and so deeply, the condition of the people;—if well applied, so salutary, and if ill applied, so mischievous to all their best interests; that it is immensely important that it should be properly disposed, and its power properly exerted. The time may come, when it will be thought as little justifiable for one man to hoard his thousands to gratify his pride, or for his own private advantages, as for another to exhaust, were it possible, in irrigating and embellishing his own private garden, the waters of a common stream, which, if suffered to flow on, might have spread fertility and beauty over an extended and now unproductive territory. It certainly would not be safe or expedient to make this a matter of legislation; but much good may be expected to result from bringing it prominently before the public mind, and thus giving a better direction to public opinion. We devoutly wish, that the sentiments contained in the following paragraphs may be universally inculcated.

Without affirming that no circumstance can justify a great accumu lation of property, it may safely be concluded, that far the greater number of those who do accumulate it, do wrong: nor do I see any reason to be deterred from ranking the distribution of a portion of great wealth, or a refusal to accumulate it, among the imperative duties which are imposed by the moral law. In truth, a man may almost discover whether such conduct is obligatory, by referring to the motives which induced him to acquire great property, or to retain it. The motives are generally impure ;-the desire of splendor, or the ambition of emipence, or the love of personal indulgence.

Perhaps it is remarkable, that the obligation not to accumulate great property for ourselves or our children, is so little enforced by writers on morality. None will dispute that such accumulation is both unwise and unkind. Every one acknowledges, too, that the general evils of the existing inequality of property are enormously great: yet how few insist upon those means, by which, more than by any other private means, these evils may be diminished.' p. 123.

But, it may be asked, Does the moral law require a man, after having acquired a reasonable competence, to abandon his business, and lie idle in the enjoyment of his acquisitions? By no means. Let him continue his business; but let him at the same time cultivate the

virtue of benevolence; and while, in pursuance of a lucrative calling, the tide of wealth flows in, let him bid it flow out again in the various channels of a munificent charity,-not always in the simple form of alms, but in sustaining and promoting those great political, moral, and christian enterprises, which constitute the glory of the present age, and the promise of a better. This is precisely what christianity requires, and what is required by every consideration connected with the welfare, the ultimate earthly perfection of individual man, of nations, and the entire human

race.

Much, in support of these views, might be drawn from scripture, which unequivocally declares, that "covetousness is idolatry;" and that "the love of money is the root of all evil." We are persuaded, that if ever there was any people, at any period, who needed a solemn lesson read to them on the subject under review, ours is that people, and this that period. But we must leave the matter to the reflections of our readers.

The practice of litigation, Mr. Dymond condemns, because of its expensiveness, its injustice, and its inquietude. Under the second head, he says:

'He who desires that justice should be dispensed between him and another, should sufficiently bear in mind how much injustice is inflicted by the law. We have seen in some of the preceding chapters, that law is often very wide of equity; and he who desires to secure himself from an inequitable decision, possesses a powerful motive to prefer arbitration. The technicalities of law, and the artifices of lawyers, are almost innumerable. Sometimes, when a party thinks he is on the eve of obtaining a just verdict, he is suddenly disappointed, and his cause is lost by some technical defect, the omission of a word, or the misspelling of a name; matters which in no degree affect the validity of his claim. * * * * It might be concluded, even if experience did not confirm it, that an arbitration, if it did not decide absolutely aright, would, at least, come to as just a decision as can be attained by human means. But experience does confirm the decision. It is known that the society of Friends never permits its members to carry disagreements with one another before courts of law. All, if they continue in the society, must submit to arbitration. And what is the consequence? They find, practically, that arbitration is the best mode; that justice is in part administered by it, administered more satisfactorily, and with fewer exceptions, than in legal courts.' pp. 127, 128.

Our laws are undoubtedly much less complicated, and the decisions from our bench, for that reason, much more generally in accordance with justice, than in Great Britain. Nevertheless, every one knows that law is often, even here, a very different thing from equity; and that some frivolous technicality may, in a given case, subject a man to absolute injustice. In a legal code, framed for

general purposes, this cannot well be avoided. Law must be precise, and its requisitions must be not only accurately defined, but accurately complied with. Fixed rules for deciding controversies between man and man, or for inflicting punishment for offences, must be uniform in their application. Yet this very uniformity will sometimes lead to a sacrifice of equity. Sin, which seems to be the only thing that gives occasion for formal laws, is so various, and so intricate in its operation, that it is almost impossible to frame general rules which shall reach it in every instance, or which shall not, in reaching it, infringe at some points on the rights and claims of the innocent.

The chapters on promises, lies, and immoral agency, we com mend to the careful perusal of all who desire to have correct views on these important topics. It is denied to be right for a man to make a wicked promise,-for instance, a promise to reveal to a robber where a friend's money is deposited, or to tell a lie, in order to save his own life. The reasoning in relation to lying, is as follows:

May a person, in order to save his property or life, commit parricide? Every reader says, No. But where is the ground of the distinction? If you may lie for the sake of such advantages, why may you not kill? What makes murder unlawful, but that which makes lying unlawful too? No man, surely, will say that we must make distinctions in the atrocity of such actions, and that though it is not lawful for the sake of advantage to commit an act of a certain intensity of guilt, yet it is lawful to commit an act of a certain gradation less. Such doctrine would be purely gratuitous and unfounded; it would be equiva lent to saying, that we are at liberty to disobey the divine laws when we think fit. The case is very simple; if I may tell a falsehood to a robber, in order to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same purpose; for lying and parricide are placed together, and jointly condemned in the revelation from God.' p. 143.

In relation to extorted promises, we have the following anecdote. La Flechère had a brother, De Gons, and a nephew, a profligate youth. This youth came to his uncle De Gons, and presenting a pistol, declared he would instantly shoot him, if he did not give him an order for five hundred crowns. De Gons, in terror, gave it; and the threat being repeated, he also promised not to prosecute him. Here we have an extorted gift, and an extorted promise. The youth afterwards went to La Flechère, told him of the present, and showed him the order. The old man, suspecting some fraud, put the order in his pocket. It was at the risk of his life. The young man immediately presented his pistol, threatening death if he did not deliver it up. La Flechere replied, that his life was secure under the protection of God, refused to give up

the order, and severely remonstrated with his nephew on his profligacy. The young man was restrained and softened, and before he left his uncle, gave him many assurances that he would amend his life.

On the subject of military glory, under the general head, The influence of individuals upon public notions of morality, our author kindles into a glow of indignant eloquence.

'Public opinion,' says he, is favorable not so much to war in the abstract or in practice, as to the profession of arms; and the inevitable consequence is, that war itself is greatly promoted, without reference to the causes for which it may be undertaken. By attaching notions of honor to the military profession, and of glory to military achievements, three wars probably have been occasioned, where there otherwise would have been but one. To talk of the "splendors of conquest," and the "glories of victory," to extol those who fall "covered with honor, in their country's cause," is to occasion the recurrence of wars, not because they are necessary, but because they are desired. It is, in fact, contributing, according to the speaker's power, to desolate provinces, and set villages in flames; to ruin thousands, and destroy thousands; to inflict, in brief, all the evils and miseries which war inflicts. "SplenCors," Glories,' "_" Honors!" The listening soldier wants to sigbalize himself like the heroes who are departed; he wants to thrust his sickle into the field of fame, and reap undying laurels. How shall he signalize himself, without a war? and in what field can he reap laurels, but on the field of battle? The consequence is inevitable.

Common talk, by a man's fire-side, contributes its little to the universal evil, and shares in the universal offense. Of the writers of some books, it is not too much to suppose, that they have occasioned more murders than all the clubs and pistols of assassins for ages have effected.

Of every species of real excellence, it is the general characteristic, that it is not anxious for applause. The more elevated the virtue, the less the desire, and the less is the public voice a motive to action.' Pp. 176, 177.

In relation to the general question, whether war is ever justifiable, an attempt is made in the third essay, and, to a great extent, a very successful one, to establish these positions: 1. "That those considerations which operate as general causes of war, are commonly such as christianity condemns. 2. That the effects of war are, to a great extent, prejudicial to the moral character of a people, and to their social and political welfare. 3. That the general character of christianity is wholly incongruous with war, and that its general duties are incompatible with it. 4. That some of the express precepts and declarations of the christian scriptures virtually forbid it. 5. That the primitive christians believed that Christ had forbidden war; and that some of them suffered death in affirmance of this belief. 6. That God has declared in prophecy, that it is

his will that war should eventually be eradicated from the earth; and that this eradication will be effected by christianity, by the influence of its present principles. 7. That those who have refu sed to engage in war, in consequence of their belief of its inconsistency with christianity, have found that Providence has protected them." pp. 428, 429.

To the copious extracts already introduced, we will add only a few sentences from the conclusion.

There is a perceptible advance in the sentiments of good men towards a higher standard of morality. The lawfulness is frequently questioned now, of actions of which a few ages ago few or none doubted the rectitude. Nor is it to be disputed, that these questions are resulting more and more in the conviction, that this higher standard is proposed and enforced by the moral law of God. Who that considers these things will hastily affirm, that doctrines in morality which refer to a standard that to him is new, are unfounded in this moral law? Who will think it sufficient to say, that strange things are brought to his ears? Such considerations have afforded encouragement in the attempt to uphold a standard, which the majority of mankind have been little accustomed to contemplate; and now, and in time to come, they will suffice to encourage, although that standard should be, as by many undoubtedly will be, rejected and condemned.' p. 431.

it

We believe that this standard is becoming more and more generally acknowledged in all parts of the christian world; and that the time is hastening on, when every thing which is inconsistent with it, though sanctioned by the customs of ages, will be indignantly frowned upon in every christian community. Within the last quarter of a century, there has been a manifest improvement in the moral sensibility of the church. The gross humors which had gathered upon her eye, and the partial paralysis which had seized upon her whole frame, are fast passing away. With greater keenness of vision, she now discerns moral distinctions which were before unobserved; and with greater delicacy of feeling, she now shrinks from practices which were before current and uncensured. No one can observe the change which, within a few years, has been effected in public opinion relative to slavery and intemperance, without being convinced that this is an age of rapid moral advancement. The science of ethics is becoming better understood; and in connection with this, the general tone of moral feeling, in the more sober and virtuous portion of the community, is approximating daily towards the gospel standard. As of old, the graces were always represented as moving together in connected dance, so the virtues are ever joined in indissoluble union; and whenever any one is elevated to its appropriate place in the practical regard and homage of a people, the others will naturally follow.

At such a time, there is a peculiar demand for able disquisitions