INSURANCE, LIFE -DEATH "DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY" CAUSED BY WAR-DEATH OF ASSURED BY ACCIDENT WHILE ENGAGED IN MILITARY DUTIES. Coxe v. Employers' Liability Assurance Co. (1916) 2 K.B. 629. In this case the construction of a policy of life insurance was in question whereby the assured was insured against death except it be "directly or indirectly" caused by war. The insured was a military officer, and, in the discharge of his military duties, was accidentally killed by a train whilst walking alongside the rails of a railway for the purpose of visiting sentries posted along the line. An arbitrator to whom the claim was referred found as a fact that the death of the insured occurred while in the discharge of his military duty, and was within the exception, and this conclusion was affirmed by Scrutton, J., on a case stated by the arbitrator. HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBANDTORT-ACTION FOR RESCISSION OF DOCUMENT FOR FRAUDMARRIED WOMAN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1882 (45-46 VICT. c. 75) s. 12—(R.S.O. c. 149 s. 16). Hulton v. Hulton (1916) 2 K.B. 642. This was an action by a wife against her husband to recover damages for deceit, alleging that by his fraudulent representations she was induced to execute a separation deed. The plaintiff also claimed to have the deed rescinded and declared void. As to the claim for damages Lush, J., held that the action was for tort, and could not be maintained; See the Married Women's Property Act, s. 12 (R.S.O. c. 149, s. 16) and could not be supported as an action for the protection of her separate property. But as to the second branch for rescission, although it was based on an alleged wrongful act of the husband, it was not an action for tort within the meaning of the section above referred to, and was maintainable, and judgment was given in favour of the plaintiff on that part of her case. CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE OF ACCOMPLICE- -CORROBORATION. The King v. Baskerville (1916) 2 K.B. 658. This was an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal from a conviction, on the ground that the evidence of an accomplice had not been sufficiently corroborated. The appellant was found guilty of the commission of a criminal offence with two boys, who were called as witnesses and were accomplices in the crime. The only corroborative evidence offered was a letter in the prisoner's handwriting addressed to one of the boys arranging for a meeting with the two boys and enclosing money. The prisoner admitted. the letter, and that the boys had come to his flat by his invitation, and alleged that they did so in order to confer with him about getting them employment. The Judge warned the jury not to convict unless in their opinion the evidence of the boys was corroborated in some material particular affecting the accused, but told them that they would be entitled to regard the above mentioned letter as sufficient corroboration. The jury found the prisoner guilty; and the Court (Lord Reading, C.J., Scrutton, Avory, Rowlatt and Atkin, JJ.) affirmed the conviction. WILL OF SOLDIER-WILL OF NURSE ON LEAVE AFTER RECEIVING ORDERS TO REJOIN ARMY-WILLS ACT 1837 (1 VICT. c. 26) s. 11-(R.S.O. c. 120 s. 14). In re Stanley, 1916, P. 192. An army hospital nurse while on leave, but after she had received orders to return to duty, wrote a letter giving the addressee full liberty to deal with her affairs, and giving directions as to the disposal of her property. The letter was unattested and the question was whether or not it was a valid soldier's will under the Wills Act 1837. (1 Vict. c. 26) s. 11 (R.S O. c. 120 s. 14). Deane, J., decided that it was, and that the addressee was executrix according to the tenor, and entit ed to probate. PRIZE COURT-ENEMY PLEDGOR OF CARGO-DEFAULT IN RESPECT OF ADVANCES SALE BY PLEDGEE-LOSS OF RIGHT TO REDEEM -RELEASE TO PURCHASER. The Ningchow (1916) P. 221. This was an application on behalf of the Crown to condemn a cargo which had been seized as prize. It appeared that the cargo was owned by Germans who had pledged it to a Japaneese bank for advances. Default having been made in payment, the bank has sold the cargo to British subjects, and the purchasers claimed that the cargo should be released to them. Evans, P.P.D., held that the right of the pledgors to redeem had been lost by the sale, and they had ceased to be owners, and he ordered the cargo to be released to the purchasers, as claimed. PRIZE COURT ENEMY (GERMAN) SHIP-ENEMY (AUSTRIAN) CARGO CARGO SEIZED BEFORE DECLARATION OF WAR CONTINUOUS SEIZURE HAGUE CONVENTION NO. VI. ARTS. 3, 4. The Schlesein (1916) P. 225. In this case a German ship had been seized after war, and taken with her cargo, owned by Austrian subjects, to Plymouth. A writ was issued against the cargo some hours before war was declared with Austria, and a second writ was subsequently issued after war was declared with that country, which remained in the custody of the officer of the Court, until by consent it was sold by the officer, and the proceeds paid into Court. On an application by the Crown claiming the proceeds as prize, Evans, P.P.D., held that although the cargo might have been claimed in the interval between the seizure of the vessel and the declaration of the war with Austria, yet as that claim was not made, and the hand of the Crown remained on the goods, they became the subject of prize as soon as war was declared, and the proceeds therefore belonged to the Crown and that the goods were not protected under the Hague No. Convention VI. arts. 3 and 4. PRIZE COURT CARGO-INSURANCE AGAINST WAR RISKS NEUTRAL PROPERTY AT DATE OF SEIZURE- -PROPERTY IN ENEMY UNDERWRITERS AT DATE OF CLAIM. The Palm Branch (1916) P. 230. This is another prize case. The facts being, that the goods in question were insured against war risks by enemy underwriters. At the time of seizure the property in the goods was in the shippers, who were neutrals. After the seizure the shippers' German agents claimed against the underwriters for a total loss. The underwriters paid in full and thereupon became owners of the goods, and the claim filed by the shippers in the Prize Court proceedings was, in fact, made by them on behalf of the underwriters. Evans, P.P.D., held that in these circumstances the enemy underwriters were really the beneficial claimants and that therefore the claim must be disallowed. COMPANY-WINDING-UP-MANAGING DIRECTOR SALARY AND COMMISSION-LOSS OF SALARY-LOSS OF PROSPECTIVE COM- In re Newman, Raphael's claim (1916), 2 Ch. 309. This was a winding-up proceeding in which the extent and amount of a claim against the company was in question. The claimant was appointed managing director for one year from July 1, 1915, at a salary of £5 per week and a commission of £5 per cent. on all sales of the company's goods. By the agreement the claimant was, on applying to the company, entitled to an option to purchase one-third of the share capital of the company, and, when he acquired such shares, it was provided that his commission should cease but his employment should continue for ten years from July 1, 1915, at £5 per week. He was not to part with the shares without the written consent of the directors On November 16, 1915, a compulsory winding-up order was made before the claimant had exercised his option. On December 3, 1915, he was employed by one of the directors, who carried on a similar business to that of the company, at £5 a week without commission and subject to a week's notice. In January, 1916, he sent in proof as a creditor of the company, claiming (a) Arrears of salary and commission up to the winding-up. (b) Damages for loss of salary from the winding-up to 30 June, 1916. (c) Damages for loss of commission during the same period. (d) Damages for loss of option to take up shares, and of right to ten years' appointment. The liquidator allowed the claim (a) and (b) up to the date the claimant obtained his new appointment, but rejected the rest of the claim. On the hearing the claimant admitted that his present appointment, though precarious, would probably continue up to 30 June, 1916 but contended that damages ought to be assessed as at the date of the breach of contract, having regard to the probability of his obtaining full employment for the term. Astbury, J., held that in the circumstances, the claimant had not proved any damages under head (b) beyond what the liquidator had allowed. He also held that the claim of loss of commission under head (c) and for oss of option under (d) were not maintainable, and that as to (d) there was an implied condition that the option should be exercised while the company was in active existence, and this condition precedent not having been complied with, the claimant had no ground of claim under that head. The Court of Appeal (Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Pickford and Warrington, L.JJ.) agreed with Astbury, J., in disallowing the claims under head (c), and the other grounds of claim do not appear to have been considered in appeal. Correspondence. APPEALS IN CERTIORARI MATTERS. To the Editor, CANADA LAW JOURNAL: DEAR SIR: Several points of interest to the profession arose in connection with the endeavour to quash a conviction in Rex v. Sinclair, 7 O.W.N. 131. Sinclair was convicted before the Police Magistrate for Toronto of stealing $5.00 from the Grand Trunk Railway Company, for whom he was working as a conductor. The evidence for the Crown showed that $5.00 had been quietly "slipped" to Sinclair to induce him not to collect the regular fare for three persons, the fare being $8.25. A motion to quash the conviction (made under Rule 1279) was refused by Mr. Justice Clute (36 O.L.R. 510). Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from Mr. Justice Clute's decision was given by Mr. Justice Kelly, under Rule 1287. Upon the appeal coming on to be heard before the Court of Appeal, counsel for the accused was called upon to shew by what right an appeal could be taken to that Court from the decision of Mr. Justice Clute, the Court intimating its opinion that no such appeal lay. The following memorandum was thereupon submitted to the Court: "Sec. 576 of the Criminal Code gives power to the Court to make rules (3) For regulating in criminal matters the pleading, practice and procedure of the Court, including the subjects of certiorari. By virtue of such authority Rules 1279 to 1288 were passed on 27th March, 1908. (See Holmested, p. 143.) Rule 1279 provides "In all cases in which it is desired to move to quash a conviction. the proceeding shall be by notice of motion," etc. Rule 1284 makes the motion returnable before a Judge in Chambers; and Rule 1287 says: "An appeal shall lie from the order of the Judge to a Divisional Court" (now the Court of Appeal) “if leave be granted by a Judge of the High Court." That leave was granted by Hon. Mr. Justice Kelly. The above rules are st ll in force and applicable to criminal proceedings in the Supreme Court of Ontario as at present constituted: |