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date, and he held that such being the case, and the premises being still out of repair, no fresh notice was necessary, following Penton v. Barnett (1898) 1 Q.B. 276, 281, although in that case some stress was laid on the fact that the premises in question were in the same physical condition as to repair as when the notice was given, whereas in the present case some repairs had been done subsequent to the notice.

CONTRACT TO DO WORK UPON GOODS AND RE-DELIVER GOODS

BURNT BY ACCIDENT ON CONTRACTOR'S PREMISES REASON-
ABLE TIME.

v. Symmons (1917) 1 K.B. 799. This was an action to recover damages for breach of a contract to do work on goods and re-deliver them. The goods in question were books to be bound by defendants. No time was specified for their delivery. On January 7, 1916, the plaintiffs demanded delivery of the whole of the books then bound, and on two occasions prior to the 20th January telephoned to the defendants, pressing for delivery. The defendants neglected to deliver the books, and on 20th January they were burnt by accidental fire on the defendants' premises. The defendants at the trial sought to excuse themselves on the ground of difficulties of transport, and shortage of labour, but this had not been previously set up as an excuse, and Avory, J., who tried the action, held that a reasonable time had elapsed from the demand for delivery, and that the defendants were guilty of a breach of contract, and liable for the loss of the goods.

HUSBAND AND WIFE—CONTRACT–SUPPLY OF GAS TO' HOUSE OCCU

PIED BY WIDOW WIDOW RE-MARRYING AND CONTINUING
OCCUPATION OF HOUSE-NON-DISCLOSURE TO GAS COMPANY OF
RE-MARRIAGE— LIABILITY.

Lea Bridge District Gas Co. v. Malvern (1917) 1 K.B. 803. The plaintiffs, a gas company, sued the defendant, a married woman, for gas supplied to a house occupied by her in the following circumstances. The house in question was originally occupied by the defendant and a former husband. After his death gas was continued to be supplied to the house, of which she continued in occupation, and was from time to time paid for by her. Subsequently 'she married again, and her seecond husband came to reside with her in the same house, and the plaintiffs, without notice of such second marriage, continued to supply gas. The defendant paid for one quarter's account for gas, after her re-marriage, but not having paid for a later quarter the present proceedings were instituted. The defendant contended that she was not liable, as she was not the consumer of the gas, that there was no contract between her and the plaintiffs, and that she was a married woman residing with her husband, who was the tenant and occupier of the premises to which the gas had been supplied. The justices who heard the complaint gave effect to these contentions, and dismissed the complaint, but stated a case for the opinion of the Court, and a Divisional Court (Lord Reading, C.J., and Ridley, and Lush, JJ.), held that the justices were wrong, and that, in the circumstances, the defendant continued liable to the company until she notified them of her re-marriage.

IN

HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND FOR RE

SCISSION OF SEPARATION DEED—FRAUD—ACTION OF TORT
RESTITUTIO INTEGRO MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY
Act, 1882 (45-46 Vict. c. 75), s. 12—(R.S.O. c. 140, s. 16).

Hulton v. Hulton (1917) 1 K.B. 813. This was an appeal from the decision of Lush, J. (1916, 2 K.B. 642, noted ante p. 13). The action was by wife against husband to set aside a separation deed made between them, on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. One question was whether the action was for "tort” within the meaning of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 12 (R.S.O. c. 140, s. 16), and another was, whether the deed having been made on an agreement that all letters between the parties should be destroyed, could now be set aside as it was impossible to restore the parties to their former position, the letters having been in fact destroyed: the Court of Appeal (Eady, Bankes, and Scrutton, L.JJ.), agreed with Lush, J., that the action was not for a tort within the meaning of the section, and that the destruction of the letters was no bar to a rescission of the deed. The Court of Appeal also held that the defendant was not entitled to a refund of moneys paid under the deed as a condition of its rescission, because he had received corresponding benefits under the deed.

RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS SEPARATION DEED COVE

NANT BY WIFE NOT TO SUE FOR THE RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL
RIGHTS-ORDER MADE NOTWITHSTANDING COVENANT.

Phillips v. Phillips (1917) P. 90. This was an action by a wife for the restitution of conjugal rights. The husband did not appear. On the hearing of the petition it appeared that the parties had entered into a separation agreement which contained a covenant on the part of the wife not to sue for restitution of conjugal rights. The plaintiff contended that the Court was under no obligation to regard the covenant unless pleaded by the defendant, and Low, J., so held, and made the order as prayed.

a

PROBATE—LOST WILL_CONTENTS-ATTESTATION CLAUSE AT

TESTING WITNESS NOT PRODUCED-NO EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY
OF WITNESSES TO WILL-PRESUMPTION OF DUE EXECUTION.

In re Phibbs (1917) P. 93. This was an application for probate of a will which had been lost. It appeared that the day before the death of the testator he requested one Knox to see that a cash box in his possession was handed to Miss Blanche Smith after his death. Knox took the box to Miss Smith and they together examined the contents and found therein a will which both read carefully. It was dated December 7, 1911, and appointed Tweedy, a Dublin solicitor, executor. The will was sent by registered post to Tweedy; but was believed to have been destroyed in a fire at the Dublin Post Office during a civil commotion. Miss Smith had been for fifteen years acting as clerk in a solicitor's office and from memory she wrote the contents of the will which according to her statement bequeathed to her a legacy of £100, a like legacy to a nephew who had in fact been killed shortly before the testator's death, a small legacy to Mr. Tweedy the executor, and the residue to Miss Smith. Some letters of the testator to the executor were found with the will, which in many respects confirmed Miss Smith's statement. Miss Smith was a niece and one of the next of kin of the testator. Beyond the statement of Knox and Miss Smith that the will appeared to have been duly executed in the presence of two witnesses, there was no evidence as to who the witnesses were, or of execution of the will, although an effort had been made, by advertisement, to discover the witnesses. The other next of kin appeared and assented to the grant. In these circumstances Low, J., granted probate of the will in the terms sworn to by Miss Smith,

COMPANY MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION CONSTRUCTION

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS ULTRA VIRES COMPANIES CoxSOLIDATION Act, 1908 (Edw. VII. C. 69) s. 3—(R.S.O. c. 178, s. 6 (2) ()-(R.S.C. c. 79, s. 7 (b)).

In re Anglo Cuban Oil Co. (1917) 1 Ch. 477. This was an application to remove the name of a company from the list of contributors to another company being wound up in the following circumstances. The applicants were the Essequibo Rubber Co. The memorandum of association of that company specified that the company might engage in almost every conceivable business which an individual could engage in, and was wide enough to cover the underwriting the shares of other companies. The applicants did underwrite the shares of the AngloCuban Oil Co., which shares were allotted to the London and Mexican Exploitation Company. All three companies being in liquidation the liquidator of the Anglo Cuban Oil Company settled the London and Mexican Exploitation Co. on the B list; and the Essequibo Co. on the B. list. The Essequibo Co. then applied to be struck off the list, on the ground that their underwriting of the shares in question was ultra vires of that company. Neville, J., refused the application; and the Court of Appeal (Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Warrington, L.J., and Lawrence, J.), affirmed his decision. Both Warrington, L.J., and Lawrence, J., express doubts as to the propriety of the registrar registering companies with such an unlimited specification of objects in their memorandum of association.

INSURANCE-PRE-WAR CONTRACT_MORTGAGE OF LIFE POLICIES

ASSURED BECOMING ALIEN ENEMY—SUBSEQUENT PAYMENT OF
PREMIUMS—REDEMPTION OF MORTGAGE BY SURETY-SURETY'S
RIGHT TO TRANSFER OF SECURITIES TRADING WITH THE
ENEMY.

Seligman v. Eagle Insurance Co. (1917) 1 Ch. 519. This was an action for redemption by a surety. The mortgage security consisted of policies on the life of the mortgagor, and the plaintiff was a surety for the payment of the debt secured by the mortgage. The policies were effected before the outbreak of the war in 1914 when the assured became an alien enemy and left the country. The surety subsequently paid the premiums, and ultimately tendered the whole debt, subject to the policies being transferred to him, but the mortgagees declined to transfer the policies except subject to the reservation that they did not warrant the validity of the policies. Neville, J., who tried the action, held that the war had not the effect of putting an end to the policies; that the payment of premiums to keep the policies alive was not a trading with the enemy, as no benefit could result to the alien enemy under the policies pending the war, but that his rights were suspended during the war. He therefore held that the plaintiff was entitled, on payment of the debt secured, to a transfer of the policies without any such reservation as that proposed by the defendants.

COMPANY – DEBENTURE NO PLACE OF PAYMENT — DUTY OF

DEBTOR TO SEEK HIS CEDITOR_INTEREST AFTER DUE DATE
LIABILITY OF COMPANY.

Fouler v. Midland Electric Corporation (1917) 1 Ch. 527. This was an action by the executor of a debenture-holder of a limited company to recover the amount of the debenture, one of a series. The debenture specified no place of payment. It was secured by a mortgage to trustees for the debenture-holders, and on the day named for payment the company had paid to the trustee the amount of the debenture and interest, and about the same time in 1913 wrote to the holder of the debenture informing her of the payment, and that the debenture should be sent to a specified bank for payment; but it turned out that the debenture-holder had died some months previously; subsequently the defendants were informed that the plaintiff was the executor of the deceased debenture-holder, and he obtained probate in November, 1913, but he put the debenture away with other papers, and forgot all about it until 1916. The company paid the principal and interest up to the due date, and the interest which had been earned on the money while in the hands of the trustee, but they objected to pay any more interest. The action was therefore brought to recover the difference between the amount of the interest at the rate borne by the debenture, and that tendered, and Eve. J., held that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed.

MORTGAGE-ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN TRUST FUND— NOTICE OF

MORTGAGE TO TRUSTEES OF FUND—SUBSEQUENT PAYMENT OF
INCOME TO MORTGAGOR — RELIEF OF TRUSTEE JUDICIAL
TRUSTEES ACT 1896 (59-CO Vict. c. 35), s. 3 (R.S.O. (. 121
s. 37).

In re Pau'son, Higgins v. Pauson (1917) 1 Ch. 541. In this case one Pawson, who was entitled to a life interest in the income of certain stocks and other personal estate in the hands of trustees of a settlement, executed a mortgage of his interest to the plaintiff, Higgins, to secure a loan. Higgins gave notice of his mortgage to the trustees but did not demand that the income

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