have been in any way due to the war. How far war circumstances would be an element in deciding the question of negligence in such cases has yet to be determined.-Law Times.

SEIZURE OF GERMAN-OWNED PROPERTY.

The Trading-with-the-enemy Act of the United States provides for the appointment "of an official known as the alien property custodian, who shall be empowered to receive all money and property in the United States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of enemy," etc.

Acting under this statute the President by executive order of October 12, 1917, empowered the alien property custodian "to require the conveyance, transfer, assignment, delivery or payment to himself, at such time and in such manner as he shall perscribe, of any money or other properties owing or belonging to or held for, by or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of any enemy or ally of an enemy, not holding a license granted under the provisions of the Trading-with-the-enemy Act, which, after investigation, said alien-property custodian shall determine is so owing, or so belongs, or is so held."

Provision is made for the payment to the alien-property custodian of any indebetedness owing to an alien enemy or for the delivery to him of any property belonging to such enemy, even though such payment or delivery may not be mandatory under the terms of the Act.

The property to be seized under the legislation to which we are referring is captured not as booty of war, but to prevent it from being used for purposes of hostility against the United States. Case and Comment.

An adult daughter who is a competent automobile driver, in taking a car in which her father has a partnership interest for business purposes, with his implied consent, for a pleasure trip on which her mother accompanies her, is held not to be the servant of her father, in Woods v. Clements, L.R.A. 1917E, 357, so as to render him liable for an injury inflicted by her negligence upon a traveler on the highway.

SHIP

REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH CASES.

(Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.)

CHARTERPARTY BILL OF LADING CONSTRUCTION CONDITION IN CHARTERPARTY THAT BILL OF LADING TO BE "CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF CARGO SHIPPED"-INCORPORATION OF CONDITIONS OF CHARTERPARTY IN BILL OF LADING.

66

Hogarth Shipping Co. v. Blyth (1917) 2 K.B. 534. This case turns upon the construction of a bill of lading. The bill of lading in question was for a specified number of bags of sugar, but it was qualified by the words "weight measure quality contents and value unknown" but it also contained the words "freight and all other conditions and exceptions as per charterparty." The charterparty contained the following clause "The Captain to sign eastern trade bills of lading which are to be deemed to be conclusive proof of cargo shipped, and their conditions to form part of this charterparty." At the port of discharge there was a shortage in the number of bags, but evidence was given that all the bags placed on board had been delivered. The question was then raised whether such evidence was admissible in the circumstances. Lush, J., on a case stated by arbitrators, thought that the conclusive clause in the charterparty was incorporated in the bill of lading, but it was conclusive only as to the number of bags but not as to their contents, and that it was open to the shipowners to shew that they had delivered all the sugar put on board. The Court of Appeal (Eady, and Scrutton, L.JJ., and Bray, J.), came to the conclusion that the conclusive clause in the charterparty was not incorporated at all in the bill of lading, because it was inconsistent with the express terms of the bill of lading, which stated that "weight measure quality contents and value unknown," Scrutton, L.J., and Bray, J., were of the opinion that the only conditions of the charterparty incorporated in the bill of lading were such, if any, as were to be performed by the consignee, including therein obligations on the shipowner, qualifying or relevant to such conditions. It may be observed that the appeal from Lush, J., was dismissed, but that learned Judge held that the shipowners were liable for the value of the missing bags, but not for their alleged contents, and all the judges of appeal consider that the shipowners were not liable even to that extent, and therefore if there had been a cross-appeal it would have been allowed.

ARBITRATION-POWER OF ARBITRATOR TO ORDER SECURITY TO BE GIVEN FOR COSTS ARBITRATION ACT 1889 (52-53 VICT. c. 49) s. 2, 1st SCHEDULE CLS. (ƒ) (i)—(R.S.O. c. 65, s. 6, SCHED. A. CLS. (i) (l).)

In Re Unione Stearinerie Lauza & Weiner (1917) 2 K.B. 558. In this matter the simple question was whether or not an arbitrator has under the Arbitration Act, s. 2, and the form of submission 'set out in the schedule to the Act (see R.S.O. c. 65, s. 6 and sched. A., cls. (i) (l).) any power to order a party to the reference to give security for the costs of the opposite party. A Divisional Court (Lord Reading, C.J., and Avory, and Shearman, JJ.), decided that he had not that power.

MAINTENANCE OF SUIT MAINTAINED

LIABILITY OF MAINTAINER.

ACTION SUCCESSFUL

Neville v. London Express Newspapers (1917) 2 K.B. 564. The Court of Appeal (Eady and Scrutton, L.JJ., and Bray, J.), have dismissed an appeal from Lord Reading, C.J. (1917), 1 K.B. 402 (noted ante p. 179), holding that an action for unlawfully maintaining an action will lie against the maintainer, notwithstanding that the action maintained proved to be successful.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT BY LESSEE FOR SELF AND ASSIGNS NOT TO SUB-LET WITHOUT LESSOR'S CONSENTSUB-LEASE-FURTHER SUB-LEASE BY SUB-LESSEE WITHOUT CONSENT LIABILITY OF LESSEE.

Mackusick v. Carmichael (1917) 2 K.B. 581. This was a counterclaim, by a lessor against his lessee for breach of covenant by the lessee that he and his assigns would not sub-let the demised premises without the consent of the lessor. The circumstances were that the lessee had sub-let part of the demised premises with the consent of the lessor, and that this sub-lessee had sublet without the leave of the lessor. The question therefore to be determined was wh ther the sub-lessee was "an assign" of the original lessee within the meaning of the covenant, and Atkin, J., held that she was not.

CHARTERPARTY-DEMURRAGE-ARRIVAL OF

SHIP IN OR OFF

PORT OF DISCHARGE-CONDITION PRECEDENT TO RUNNING
OF LAY DAYS USELESSNESS OF ARRIVAL.

Owners of S. S. Plata v. Ford (1917) 2 K.B. 593. This was an action by shipowners for demurrage. The charterparty provided that the ship should discharge her cargo at a certain rate "time to count twenty-four hours after arrival in or off port

of destination whether berth available or not." Her port of discharge was Havre and in the course of her voyage she received notice that if she went to Havre she would be sent back to Cherbourg, a distance of 75 miles, to await her turn when she could be received at Havre. Accordingly the vessel put in to Cherbourg and remained there several days until she received permission from the French authorities to proceed to Havre. Bailhache, J., on a case stated by an arbitrator held that the lay days did not begin to run until the vessel actually arrived in or off Havre; and the fact that it would have been useless to proceed there sooner than she did did not excuse her arrival at Havre as a condition precedent to the running of lay days.

CHARTERPARTY-TIME CHARTER-HIRE TO CEASE ON LOSS OF

SHIP REQUISITION OF SHIP BY ADMIRALTY-LOSS BY WAR
RISKS RIGHT OF CHARTERERS TO SHARE IN ADMIRALTY

COMPENSATION.

London American M. T. Co. v. Rio de Janerio T. L. & P. Co. (1917) 2 K.B. 611. This was an action by shipowners to recover the amount due for hire of a vessel under a charterparty. The charterparty was made in 1914, and provided for the use of the vessel by the charterers for a period of eight years, but, if the ship was lost in the meantime, hire was to cease from the day of its loss. The vessel was requisitioned by the Admiralty on the terms that if she was lost by war risks compensation based on her value would be paid. Shortly afterwards the vessel was sunk by the enemy. The defendants the charterers claimed to be entitled to a share of the compensation payable by the Admiralty; and the action was brought to determine whether or not they had any such right, and Rowlatt, J., who tried the action, held that the compensation was in the nature of insurance money, and that the rights of the charterers having ceased the moment the vessel was lost, they had no right to participate in the compensation.

ADMIRALTY-MARITIME LIEN-DISCHARGE OF LIEN BY VOLUNTEERS AFTER SALE OF VESSEL-ACTION IN REM FOR REIMBURSEMENT-DOCTRINE OF SUBROGATION.

The Petone (1917) P. 198. This case involved the consideration of the doctrine of subrogation. The circumstances of the case were briefly as follows: The plaintiff's claim was in rem against the Petone for wages paid to the master and crew and for disbursements made by the master, which the plaintiffs had paid when acting as agents of former owners of the vessel, in order to effect a sale of it. No assignment had been made to the

plaintiffs of the claims which they thus discharged, and which constituted a maritime. lien on the vessel. The vessel was sold, and subsequently re-sold to the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed to be subrogated to the rights of the master and crew in respect of the claims which they had thus paid off: but Hill, J., held on an application to set aside the writ as disclosing no cause of action, that, in the absence of any assignment of the claims of the master and crew, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any lien in respect of the payments they had made, and the writ was accordingly set aside.

PRIZE COURT TRADING BETWEEN

FOREIGN AND BRITISH BRANCHES OF ENEMY FIRM GOODS TRANSMITTED TO BRANCH IN ENGLAND OF ENEMY FIRM.

The Achilles (1917) P. 218. Evans, P.P.D., in this case held that goods shipped after the outbreak of the war on a British vessel by the Bangkok branch of an Austrian firm, and delivered to the warehouse of the firm in Manchester, were liable to condemnation as prize.

ADMIRALTY SALVAGE NEUTRAL VESSEL

CARGO OF MUNI

TIONS FOR FRENCH GOVERNMENT ATTACK BY SUBMARINE-
SERVICES RENDERED BY BRITISH ARMED TRAWLERS.

The Carrie (1917) P. 224. This was a claim for salvage by the officers and crews of two British armed trawlers. The vessel salved was a Swedish vessel carrying munitions for the French Government. She was stopped by an enemy U-boat and her crew ordered to take to the boats. The submarine was preparing to sink her, when two British armed trawlers appeared, and she desisted. The crew refused to return to the vessel and the trawlers took her in charge and brought her to port. It was contended that in performing this service they were merely performing a public duty in protecting the property of the French Government, but Hill, J., held that such public duty did not extend to the vessel itself, and that the salvage was not only from attack by the enemy, but also, owing to the action of the crew, a salvage from maritime perils and he awarded £750.

COMPANY-MEETING-VOTING

OF

BY PROXY-APPOINTMENT PROXIES TO BE LODGED TWO DAYS BEFORE MEETING-ADJOURNED MEETING-APPOINTMENTS OF PROXIES LODGED AFTER MEETING BUT BEFORE ADJOURNED MEETING.

McLaren v. Thomson (1917) 2 Ch. 261. This was an appeal from the decision of Astbury, J. (1917) 2 Ch. 41 (noted ante p. 339), holding that where the articles of a limited company require