So in my view, the issue is a complex one that would require a considerable study in order to grant an exemption.

Mr. ASSELSTINE. Mr. DeFazio, there is an excellent memorandum from an attorney in our General Counsel's office.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Is this Mr. Trubatch?

[EDITOR'S NOTE.-5/29/84 Memo for Garner, Joosten, Chestnut, Austin, and Meyer from Sheldon Trubatch on Appendix R.]

On March 22, 1984, the staff informed you of its extensive interpretations of the fire protection requirements in 10 C.F. Part 50, Appendix R. I believe that some of these

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retations are inconsistent with the fire protection ments. In addition, five fire protection engineers NRC staff have filed a differing professional opinion oning some of the interpretations of Appendix R. engineers and I believe that some of the interpre

s may constitute significant changes in the rule made vit out notice and comment rulemaking. Accordingly, 1 recommend that when the Commission meets with the staff it should: (1) discuss the nature and extent of the interpreations of Appendix R; (2) determine the acceptability of substance of the changes made by the interpretations; 16 (3) decide whether notice and comment rulemaking is cessary to adopt the interpretations found acceptable by the Commission.

The Interpretations of Appendix R

Staff has made six major interpretations of the fire protection regulations and several minor ones in the course of answering licensees' questions. Of the six maior interpretations, several appear to substantially modify Appendix R. Some of these interpretations were also the subjects of the differing professional opinion referred to above. The interpretations at issue are discussed seriatim below.

a. Fire Boundaries

The concept of fire boundaries is central to the concept of fire protection design. Fire boundaries are partitions -walls, ceilings and floors -- which divide a building into

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fire areas. These fire areas are the basis for determining whether redundant or alternate equipment will not be damaged by one fire. In general, two sets of equipment are redundant or provide adequate alternatives if they are in different fire areas or sufficiently separated within a fire

area.

Fire boundaries which define fire areas are generally understood to be delineated by partitions each of which has a surface area with a uniform "fire rating," i.e., a uniform ability to retard the spread of fire, heat and combustion products. For example, if a wall har a doorway cut into it, that doorway must contain a door which has the same fire rating as the surrounding wall.

Fartial boundaries

The proposed interpretation of Appendix F would permit licensees to use fire boundaries which dc not have uniform tre ratings. Some boundaries would not even be completely sealed. Fire areas could be defined t If the licensee has determined that t are adequate. The licensee's deter. on an evaluation not subject to prio subject to subsequent audit by an ins;

partial boundaries on would be based iew by NRR, but ion team.

When the Commission promulgated Append... R, it established a three-hour fire barrier or its equivalent-as the appropriate method for protecting redundant cr alternate equipment in the same fire areas. This choice of fire barrier was based on the commonly used fire barriers or delineating fire areas in commercial buildings, whit present far less potential for adverse consequence in the event of a fire. The Browns Ferry fire clearly illustrated the consequences of not requiring penetrations to be sealed by material having the same fire rating as the surrounding barriers. Appendix R was intended to complete the fire modifications deemed necessary after Browns Ferry. Therefore, to now interpret Appendix R so as not to incorporate a fundamental lesson learned at Browns Ferry wolic appear to directly contradict the Commission's intent ir. promulgating Appendix

R.

Members of the fire protection staff are also critical of this interpretation. They believe that it will lead to inordinate delay in licensee compliance with Appendix R and may result in the acceptance of inconsistent alternatives to three hour barriers at different plants. The staff believes that delay will arise from the deferral of NRC's review of alternatives until after they have been installed by

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licensees. Even if the NRC disagrees with a licensee's evaluation of the adequacy of an alternative, it will remain in place while the staff and licensee argue over the acceptability of that alternative. The staff believes that inconsistent alternatives will be accepted because different audit teams will inspect different plants. Such delays and inconsistencies could be avoided if all licensee alternatives were reviewed in advance by the same members of the fire protection staff.

Delay and inconsistency were two of the fundamental reasons which motivated, the Commission to promulgate Appendix R. While some licensees diligently upgraded their plants in response to the post-Browns Ferry fire protection positions by the staff, other licensees vigorously resisted making expensive changes. Moreover, the staff had reported to the Commission that the staff had accepted widely different fire protection modifications at different plants because different staff members had reviewed different plants.

In CLI-80-21, the Commission clearly indicated that it wanted the upgrading of fire protection to be completed promptly and no later than June 30, 1982. While the original deadline was not met, the final rule in 10 C.F.R. 50.48 incorporated new deadlines which the Commission believed could be met. As for inconsistencies between plants, the Commission chose to proceed by rule rather than by order to ensure a uniform fire protection program.

Staff's interpretation of Appendix R would substantially undo much of what the Commission wanted to accomplish by promulgating Appendix R. Therefore, the Commission should request the staff to explain how this interpretation of Appendix R is consistent with the basic goals the Commission sought to implement by promulgating Appendix R.

b. Cold Shutdown

The issue here is how soon after a fire does an operating reactor have to be brought to cold shutdown. The generally accepted view was that cold shutdown had to be attained no later than 72 hours after a fire. During the rulemaking proceeding on Appendix R and the subsequent litigation over it, some utilities contended that cold shutdown within 72 hours after a fire was unrealistic and unnecessary and that hot shutdown within 72 hours would be good enough.

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The current interpretation reads Appendix R to partially adopt the industry position. Under this interpretation, only reactors which have an alternative or dedicated shutdown made in addition to the normal shutdown modes must be able to achieve cold shutdown in 72 hours. This requirement would not apply to all other reactors which do not require such additional shutdown equipment because their normal shutdown modes satisfy the redundancy criteria. For these reactors which were properly designed initially, Appendix R would not require the attainment of cold shutdown in 72 hours but only the capability to repair within 72 hours the systems necessary to achieve cold shutdown. There would be no minimum time required for achieving cold shutdown.

This interpretation divides reactors into two classes: those capable of achieving the ultimate safe state of cold shutdow no later than 72 after a fire, and those which will only be required to be brought to hot shutdown within 72 hours afte: : fire. No safety basis for this distinction Moreover, this distinction contradicts

has been r the Com

promulgat

be brought :

ded.

's understanding of Appendix R when it was The Commission was concerned that all reactors cold shutdown as quickly as possible after a fire. Thus this interpretation is arguably a major modification to Appendix R which may require notice and comment before adoption.

Anothe: basic principle of fire protection design is that alter or redundant structures, systems and components are not damaged by the same fire. In some instances, plants contain redundant equipment which can be damaged by one fire. In some of those cases, licensees sought exemptions from the requirement for redundant structures, systems or components by claiming that there are alternate pathways which achieve the same functions in the plants and which will not be damaged by a fire which would damage the structures, systems or components which are inadequately redundant.

This interpretation will permit the grant of exemptions on a showing that the alternative will be "free from fire damage": a phrase in Part 50 which is understood to mean capable of performing its intended function before, during and after a postulated fire.