single. It was one and the same principle, the search after unity, which impelled him to actualize the ideal and to idealize the actual. The former he attempted by giving outward form to the creations of his genius; the latter, by seeking in every object the idea which lies beneath it, and of which its external development is but an imperfect symbol.

As to the remaining part of the charge against Goethe, that he has formed no school, produced no system," we admit it; but confess ourselves unable to perceive the sequitur that he was no thinker. We had not supposed that the words thinker and system-maker are synonymous. Goethe has not, it is true, presented his reflections in the form of a regular system of philosophy; they lie scattered through his works; they are interspersed with narrative and biography. But we are not aware that they are, on this account, less valuable. It is possible that they are more so. The rage for system-making, is at least of equivocal tendencies. But no one can read Goethe without finding

"Deposited, upon the silent shore

Of memory, images and precious thoughts,
That cannot die, and shall not be destroyed."

Nor, even were Goethe's works destitute of abstract reflections and aphorisms, could it thence be inferred that he was no thinker. The poet, the artist, is the thinker. Does he not as truly give us himself, as truly "render his mind a portion of the age in which he lives," in the creations of his genius, as in his most profound reflections? If no man is to be considered a thinker who has not promulgated a system, it is at least certain, that Goethe will not be left alone in his condemnation. The artists of all ages, the Homers and Shakspeares, the Raphaels and Guidos, whom we have reverenced, will fall with him. They, too, exerted no influence on their age-rendered their mind in no respect a portion of the age in which they lived!

Goethe's death took place on the 22d of March, 1832, when he was eighty-two years old, and after an illness of only six days. To the very last, he had continued the occupations in which he found so much pleasure, and carried on a frequent intercourse by letter with many of his absent friends. Among the dearest of these was Zelter. "Zelter was in perfect health when Goethe died. But the first Saturday after, (the day on which he used to receive his letters,) he became dejected and silent; the second found him ill; and, on the third, death softly led him to rejoin his immortal friend."

ART. VII.-Moral Views of Commerce, Society, and Politics, in twelve Discourses. By ORVILLE DEWEY. New York: David Felt & Co., Stationers' Hall. 1838. 12mo. pp. 300.

MR. DEWEY has undertaken in these discourses- doubtless at the risk of some personal odium—to bring the principles of morality and religion emphatically home to "men's business and bosoms;" and he has, in general, well performed the task. Differing as we do fundamentally from Mr. Dewey in matters of theology, we are glad to perceive that his peculiar theological views are not brought forward in the volume before us; and we feel bound, moreover, to assure our readers, that so far as we can perceive, the value of this book for the community at large is not indirectly impaired by his holding such opinions. Some readers may, perhaps, think, that a man holding a different theological system would have treated some of the topics better; but whoever may find occasion to dissent from any of the opinions of this work, will do so, for the most part, on other than purely theological grounds. The object of the work—its general spirit— and, for the most part, though with exceptions we shall notice, its sentiments and opinions, meet our hearty approbation; while the elevated moral tone, the calm and candid yet full and fearless utterance of unpopular truth, and often the profound and searching views, the beauty and nobleness of the thoughts, and the force and eloquence of the style, compel a sentiment of respect and homage which we confess is seldom excited in our mind.

In his preface, Mr. Dewey anticipates that objections may be felt to the treatment of such topics in the pulpit; and he sets himself to justify his course. There exists, undoubtedly, and to a considerable extent, a prejudice which would confine the preacher within certain narrow and technical limits; and this prejudice, among other causes, has, no doubt, operated extensively to diminish the salutary influence of the pulpit—to render its ministrations comparatively inefficient.

"The question then is," says Mr. Dewey, "what is the proper range of the pulpit? What is the appropriate business of preaching? The answer is plain-to address the public mind on its moral and religious duties and dangers. . . . . . And wheresoever conscience goes to work out its perilous problem, shall not the preacher follow it? It is not very material, whether a man's integrity for

sakes him at the polls in an election, or at the board of merchandise; or at the house of rioting, or the gates whose way leadeth to destruction. Outwardly it may be different, but inwardly it is the same. In either case, the fall of the victim is the most deplorable of all things on earth; and most fit, therefore, for the consideration of the pulpit." Pref., pp. vi., vii.

There is unquestionably a great deal of truth in these remarks. It makes little difference in the result, whether integrity, virtue, and religion, be sacrificed in the resorts of trade, the haunts of fashion, and the arena of political strife—or in any other and less accredited spheres. And surely if any minister's congregation is chiefly composed of those persons who are especially exposed to the moral dangers of "Commerce, Society, and Politics," we cannot see but he may-nay, we cannot see but he should devote a due proportion of his time to the work of setting forth those dangers, and fortifying his flock against them. It is the duty of every man engaged in trade, society, and politics, to be governed by the principles of morality and religion; and it seems to us equally the duty of the minister of religion to enforce these obligations with such proportion of time and of special application as circumstances may require. He is bound, indeed, in all propriety, to treat these topics as a christian minister, and not as a merchant, a man of fashion, or a politician. The proportionable treatment of such special topics, moreover, need not interfere with the other functions of the pulpit; for, as Mr. Dewey observes, and — taking his language within the fair limits of his meaning-truly observes:

......

"There is time enough in the pulpit for all things. Nay, it wants variety. It is made dull by the restriction and reiteration of its topics. It would gain strength by a freer and fuller grasp of its proper objects. But the great evil, I am sensible, lies deeper-too deep for any sufficient consideration, within the narrow limits of a preface. The pulpit not only fails in this matter, but it fails on principle, and on a principle almost universally adopted. The evil is, that sermons, pulpits, priests-all the active agents that are laboring in the service of religion- are, by the public judgment as well as by their own choice, separated from the great mass of human actions and interests." Pref., p. viii.

To what extent the evil here indicated exists, we shall not take upon us to say; but so far as concerns the ministers of religion, the reason, we think, is to be found, partly in the fact that they have unconsciously imbibed the prevalent opinion which limits their sphere of agency, and partly in the fact that they acquiesce

in a state of opinion which they may think it hopeless to resist. The public opinion by which their sphere is restricted has also, we think, a two fold source: first, an unreflecting prejudice on the part of religious and devout persons-a too limited view of the scope and end of the pulpit, and a too exclusive demand for systematic doctrinal exposition, for sermons adapted to excite the religious sensibilities, and awaken devout emotions; and, secondly, a very natural aversion on the part of another class of persons a very respectable body of church-goers-to have the strict obligations of morality, the uncompromising claims of religion, carried round and pressed home into the very heart and soul of their week-day lives. They willingly go to church to hear an exposition of abstract doctrine, or a general discussion in morals, or even an impressive and eloquent exhibition of some solemn truth relative to the "world that is to come;" but the rest of the week they are absorbed in the interests of the "world that now is"-trade, society, politics-and into that world they do not care to be followed and disturbed by any rules higher or stricter than those of custom, convention, civil law, or, at the most, the general sense of honor.

But we must pass beyond Mr. Dewey's preface—it is not within the purpose of this article to discuss at large the subject to which it relates. Whether Mr. Dewey has done right or wrong in introducing the discussion of such topics into his pulpit, our present concern is with what he has said. His discourses are now before the world as a book; and as such, we wish to call attention to some portions of it, which we think worthy of all consideration.

The first discourse is upon the "moral laws of trade," and it is less satisfactory to us than either of the others. A great many just remarks are made-some points of curious disquisition, as for instance, the theory of the "value of specie currency," are put in a clear light-a wide extent of ground is gone over, and yet no important, or even definite and precise result is attained, at all commensurate with the expectation raised at the outset, or with the parade made on the road. In truth, we feel as if we had committed ourselves to the conduct of an insufficient guide, who, instead of going forward with a firm and intelligent tread, had involved himself and us in the intricacies of complicated forest paths-taking us hither and thither at random, and at length bringing us out where we entered, with no more valuable or definite knowledge of the region we had traversed, than we could have gathered at a glance, standing on the edge.

The truth is, as it seems to us, that the only general principle which can be laid down on the subject is, that every man in trade is bound to deal with integrity, honesty, and fairness, and not to cheat or overreach; and the question concerning his superior sagacity, information, etc., and the use and advantage he may rightfully make of them, is of comparatively little consequence, as to any practical conclusion to which Mr. Dewey's discussions come, over and above that general principle. That a man may rightfully use his superior sagacity and information in trade, the author seems to consider as open to question, or at least, that it is a point upon which conscientious doubts do exist. For ourselves, we can only say, we never supposed that any body could doubt the moral right of "using" one's superior sagacity and information in trade. We never heard it called in question. The only question seems to us to be, concerning the fair "limitations" imposed by "justice and philanthropy ;" and to the settlement of this question, we cannot regard the author's contributions as very important or valuable. In fact, to judge from the appendix, the impression produced by the discourse seems to have been somewhat such as we should expect; and the author finds it necessary to relieve perplexity and remove misconception, by reiterating that the whole amount of his result is, that men must keep within the "limitations of justice and philanthropy."

Now, the general rule, that we are not to cheat or overreach, is one that is apparent of itself, without the help of Mr. Dewey's disquisitions; and it does not seem to us to be put in any clearer or stronger light by them. And to the more important and difficult question, what is cheating or overreaching in trade, or in any department of business,-it seems to us impossible to frame an answer that will exactly apply to whole classes of cases, and impossible also to frame an answer that will apply to any one special case, unless all the actual circumstances and particulars are before us. At all events, it seems to us, that the author's disquisitions can be of very little assistance to the practical man of business. In fact, it is far easier for the trader to determine for himself what would be cheating or overreaching in any particular transaction, than for our author to give him any important or valid direction. Men in business have generally a very clear and correct understanding of what is the fair price to put upon merchandize taking into just estimate, original cost, charges, interest, state of the market, risks of credit granted, etc. These things naturally, and almost necessarily, settle themselves cor