independent power; the latter was justly claimed by the confederates, as both their own conduct, and that of the king's enemies, sufficiently evinced. If they were backward in handing over supplies to Ormond, their diffidence of their application was justified by experience; and if they refused the sale of arms in their quarters, i. e. the disarming of their troops, having had abundant trial of the perfidies practized on them by almost all officers acting in the king's name, it only proved them not quite ideots. Well, how did this paragon of loyalty, the hero of Carte's romance, manage these acknowleged loyal confederates? To the satisfaction of the English commons, and the injury of the king. "The marquis of Ormond experienced various difficulties in supporting and regulating his army, preserving the public peace, and managing the proud and intractable spirits of the Irish confederates. His favourite object was, to break their union; and, for this purpose, he desired a power of granting pardons to such particulars as should return to his majesty's obedience. The demand was discovered to the confederates; nor were they insensible of its dangerous tendency: yet Ormond was not discouraged. He held his correspondence with some of their principal leaders; he flattered their ambition; he hinted, that by zealously exerting themselves in the king's service, they might hereafter be preferred to such places of trust and honour as suited their birth and quality, and enjoy that consequence in Ireland which their inferiours of English birth had hi

therto obtained. Many considerable places were now vacant, which were eagerly solicited by various competitors about the court of England. These he recommended to be still kept unfilled; at least, that they should be conferred on moderate Irish protestants, as the method to which neither party could justly except, and the safest to be pursued for allaying national discontents."*

How did the loyal viceroy deal with the king's enemies? Just as a hearty rebel would do. He laboured to unite the king's troops with the Scotch rebels under Monroe; and after saying and publishing some things against the covenant, like his friend Audley Mervin, he loyally advised his majesty's troops, not to take that oath of treason against the king, and persecution against his subjects, until they consulted. Whom? The king's enemies! "But the English officers of the royal party were not deceived by this apparent lenity. They every moment expected an order from the English parliament for imposing the covenant by force; and their apprehensions were confirmed, when a commission from the English houses, under their broad seal, was received by Monroe, empowering him to command all the forces of Ulster, Scottish and English, in their name, and under their authority, and to carry on the war against all the enemies of the covenanted party. The royalists assembled at Belfast to resolve on an answer to be returned the Scottish general, when he should require

*Leland, Vol. III. B. V. c. vi. p. 220. 221.

them to submit to his command. In the midst of their consultation, Monroe contrived to surprise the town. Hence he marched to take possession of Lisburne, but was foiled in his attempt by the spirit and vigilance of the English officers. The Ulster forces were thus on the point of declaring war against each other. The superiour numbers of the Scots were formidable to the English; the resolute spirit of the English was alarming to the Scots; an amicable agreement was the interest of both; and a stipulation was soon framed and subscribed. It was agreed, that the English should not be forced to take any oath contrary to their consciences and the fundamental laws of Ireland, until they should first address themselves to the English parliament, and represent their reasons and scruples to the contrary; that their regiments should be furnished with the same provisions, and have the same privileges and appointments with the Scots. On these conditions, they engaged to join with Monroe in a vigorous prosecution of the Irish rebels, unless his majesty's command should hereafter contradict their further proceeding."

This speedy junction of his majesty's troops in Ulster with the Scotch rebels there; their acceptance of part of the supply sent from the rebel parliament; their acceptance of the covenant; what else can be understood from the travestied language of Carte, or his copiest Leland? That they would not take it without consulting the

* Leland, Vol. III. B. V. c. vi. p. 224. 225.

king's enemies; and proposing their scruples to those very men, who sent over positive orders to impose it. Conscientious men! Their scruples were soon removed when they entered into an alliance with the king's sworn enemies, and promised to carry on war in conjunction against the most loyal of his subjects. Such was the care pretended by Carte and Leland to have been taken of the loyalty of his majesty's troops, by his loyal viceroy, Ormond. I can see nothing in the conduct of that man at all compatible with the double part assigned him, that was not detrimental to his king and country, serviceable to their enemies.

The event, however, completely vindicates the hesitation and parsimony of the confederates, in the grant of supplies, and the necessary precaution of not suffering their troops to be disarmed in their quarters, on pretence of employing them for the king's service, while arms and stores lay in the king's magazine at the castle unemployed. No wonder the confederates were enraged and alarmed at this unprovoked breach of the cessation. "The seizure of Belfast, and the union of the Ulster forces, were incidents both alarming and provoking to the confederate Irish at Kilkenny. Their forces were scattered, their generals divided by frivolous competitions. Their pride was inflamed by that consequence which they had gradually acquired. While they detached Castlehaven to the assistance of Owen O'Nial, they made private overtures to the marquis of Ormond, that he should accept the supreme command of all their forces, and march against

the stubborn Northerns with the whole united power of the royalists: for in this party the Irish affected to be ranked. At the same time, they required that he should proclaim the Scots rebels, in consequence of their outrageous infringement of the cessation.

"It was obvious for Ormond to reflect, that by accepting the command of the Irish, he must blend the rightful power of the king with the usurped authority of the rebels, in a manner odious to every protestant subject, disgraceful to his royal master, and really dangerous to himself, however the bold measure might be recommended by some present advantages. To issue a proclamation against the Scots, and to brand their adherence to the parliament with the name of rebellion, appeared equally dangerous and obnoxious. It must afford them a fair pretence for their opposition to the king, furnish them with plausible arguments for seducing others, and provoke numbers of protestants, puritans at least, if not secretly favourers of the covenant. The marquis therefore, could not, consistently with the plainest rules of prudence, irritate the English parliament, already his enemies, and hazard the revolt of almost all his forces. On the other hand, it was dangerous to disoblige the Irish. They might find pretences for with-holding that part of their subsidy which remained unpaid. They had promised to supply him with corn and cattle: they might retract this promise: they might cut off all commerce and freedom of markets. The scanty and precarious remittances from England,