Bourne, the correctness, the fullness, and the fimplicity of Gro tius, or the force and dignity of Scaliger.

In the Preface, where the Author adopts the opinions of Mr. Harris, in difcriminating the different fpecies of criticism, he has not imitated the manner, or preserved the perfpicuity of that elegant and amiable writer,

We are equally pained and furprised to obferve fuch defects in the latinity of a writer, who poffeffes no mean stock of erudition, and has afpired to the arduous task of correcting and tranflating Greek poets, the remains of whom are known only to the curious, and scarcely understood even by the most learned.

But whatever imperfections may be found in this work, we must respect the learning, and commend the diligence of the Author. He has frequently failed, where greater critics have not been more fuccessful; but he never attempts to depreciate their merit, in order to exalt his own. This must be acknowledged in justice to the Author, and to ourselves. For we are always inclined to encourage philological researches; and more especially, when they are conducted with candour and diffidence, with an honest defire to excel, and a juft fenfe of fuperior excellence.

ART. III. A Syftem of Tactics, Practical, Theoretical, and Hiftorical. Tranflated from the French of M. Joly de Maizeroy, Colonel of Infantry, and Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, by Thomas Mante, Efq. late Major of Brigade. 8vo. 2 vols. 13s. boards. Cadell.

HE Treatife before us is improperly ftyled a fyftem, a term

which implies a chain of principles and conclufions following and depending on each other; wherein every proposition, from the fimpleft movement to the most complex manoeuvre, is defined and demonftrated. In this work, it is, on the contrary, supposed, that the reader is acquainted with the elements of the science on which it is written, and fuch as are not poffeffed of that preliminary knowledge, are referred to other books for information. The Author indeed feems confcious of the deficiency, for which he thus apologizes: It may be thought,' (fays he) that a fyftem of tactics fhould begin by the elementary part; that it should firft explain the manner in which men are to be raised, the rules which ought to be obferved in the choice of them, how they are to be formed into esconades, companies and regiments and then proceed to the method of disciplining, arming, and difpofing of them: but as thefe objects are contained in the French military code, and every nation has its own particular regulations, I thought it unneceffary to enter into details, with which I must fuppofe the reader fufficiently acquainted.'

Not

Notwithstanding this apology, we cannot help thinking that fome of these articles fhould have appeared in the work, to entitle it to the appellation of a fyftem of tactics; not that the manner of raifing or chufing men makes any part of that science, the object of which is the forming and manoeuvring them when raised and chofen. But enough of the title; let us proceed to examine the contents of the work, the fcope and arrangement of which will be best understood from the Author's own words, in part of his Preface.

6

Among the great number of books we have on the art of war, fome are too dry, including only general maxims; others too voluminous; there are others again merely fyftematical. M. de Feuquieres, indeed, gives us examples with his precepts, but he confines himfelf to what he was an eye-witness of, or what happened in his own time. It appeared to me, that a work of a proper fize, partly dogmatical and historical, which should unite in the fame point of view the fyftems of the different ages, and in which we might fee the principles of the art reduced to practice, and exemplified by a detail of great actions, could not but prove equally curious and inftructive, without difgufting those who have but little time to fpare, or no tafte for large works. I do not pretend to give any rules of my own making; I content myfelf with being the interpreter of the greatest mafters in the art, whose theory is the refult of their own experience and knowledge. These are my authorities. Nobody, therefore, I hope, will, after this avowal, accufe me of rafhnefs. If I call certain things into question, it is because the ableft may err, and principles once corrupted degenerate into the most dangerous prejudices.

Though the invention of powder and of new arms have occafioned various changes in the mechanism of war, we are not to believe, that it has had any great influence on the fundamental part of that science, nor on the great manœuvres. The art of directing the great operations is still the fame. It is from a contrary opinion that for about a century past fo many bad maxims prevailed, and that we have left the right track. It is this that has made us extend our battalions at the expence of their depth, and form thin and fluctuating lines, without either folidity or action. It is this which has induced us to multiply our fire-arms, and endeavour, by an extreme quick difchange of them, to compensate the lofs of that advantage which is no longer to be obtained by an heavy fhock. It is this, in fine, and perhaps a fhameful effeminacy, which has made us lay afide defenfive arms, which were the support of valour, and carried it to its greatest length. After all it cannot be faid, that we, as a nation have loft any part of our power, because our neighbours have adopted the fame methods, and at the fame time with ourselves. If our forces are become enervate, theirs have degenerated in an equal proportion. As all the nations of Europe imitate each other from a spirit of fashion; as one purfues a new fyftem, the others adopt it, without giving themselves much trouble to examine its utility. Whence it often happens, that we give into practices which agree but little with the national character. It was not thus the Romans imitated other nations: they did it by masters, who fcrutinized the nature of the several objects which came before them, and the relations they could have with the

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whole

whole of their regulations; and when they once adopted any thing, they constantly abided by it.

When we shall have under our eyes, as it were, the methods of the most famous captains amongst the ancients, compared with those of our own, we shall be able to form a clearer judgment of these matters. It is with this view I have taken more pains to give facts than reafons. Examples may perfuade, whereas it is from the mouths of illuftrious men only precepts are admitted.

To judge of the great art with which the ancients carried on their military operations, we must be acquainted with their regulations, their arms, and their cuftoms. This conftitutes the first part of the prefent System of Tactics, and ferves as an introduction to it. The readers, already verfed in the art of war, will eafily recollect what they know of the fubject, and perhaps difcover fome obfervations that have efcaped them. The reft may flatter themselves with poffeffing an historical miniature of the different methods of the ancients, and of their manner of fighting.

The fecond part contains the defcription of feveral battles, arranged under that clafs of difpofition with which it corresponds. The account of every action is followed by obfervations, and fometimes parallels, and often, as occafion offers, a theory on the manœuvres. If the reader here meets with the battles of Arbela, Leuftra, Mantinea, and Pharfalia, though the plans of them have been already given, it is because these actions are more analogous to my fubject than any others. Befides, I cannot help thinking, that what has already been faid of these actions, is far from being as exact as it might have been. But in rectifying thefe accounts, it has been by no means my intention to fet up for the original writer of them: I acknowledge with pleasure the merit of thofe authors to whom we are indebted for them, and also the great utility of their labours in works of that kind.

The third part treats of the Tactics of the Turks, of the Perfians, and Mamalukes, and of the orders of battle common amongst those nations: I give fome of the battles fought by them with each other, or between the Turks and the Chriftians: to these I add remarks, and withal endeavour to throw fome new lights on the most important matters. I give fome account of many difpofitions, of which Vegetius has not fpoken: in the examples I apply to them, we fhall fee fuch mafter-ftrokes, as may ferve for rules in fimilar cafes. The two laft chapters contain an examination of the cunæus, or wedge of the ancients, with observations on the fyftem of M. de Folard. In the fourth part, I apply a new fyftem of Elementary Tactic to the different operations of war; I fpeak of feveral difpofitions, offenfive and defenfive; and as much as the limits I have prefcribed to myfelf will permit, of every other object of the military art. I have endeavoured to felect all those paffages of hiftory, which I thought could be most useful and interefting to a foldier, to give him models to copy in every cafe, as well as inftances of faults he ought to avoid : in fhort, to exhibit the art of war in its operations, and to illuftrate its principles by facts.'

Such is the plan of this work, which is executed in a manner that befpeaks the Author a man of extensive reading, and a diligent investigator of the scientific part of his profeffion.

In the first chapter, treating of the origin of war and arms, he gives a fenfible and entertaining detail of the armour, weapons, chariots, and diicipline of the ancient people of Afia; with many general remarks on military arrangements. One affertion we muft, however, beg leave to controvert, and that by an inftance drawn from his own country. It is where he fays, the infantry was ever deemed the principal part of the army;' and that 'fuch civilized nations as had a military police, always obferved a proportion between their cavalry and their infantry;' ever confidering the latter as the beft fupport and principal foundation of their power. Whereas Pere Daniel, in his Hift. de la Milice Françoife, declares, that from the reign of Charlemagne to that of Charles the 7th, a period of more than five hundred and fifty years, the French infantry was of little eftimation, being compofed, as Brantome fays, of a base, ill-armed, disorderly banditti. "Que de marants, belliftres, mal-armez, mal-complexionnez, fainears, pilleurs, & mangeurs du peuple." We do not mean to fay that infantry is not the moft ufeful part of an army, but only to fhew it has not, as there afferted, been ever so deemed.

In a detail of the arms and difcipline of the Greeks and Romans, he describes the phalanx of the first, and the legion of the laft-afterwards comparing the properties and advantages of those two orders, with an accuracy and precifion which demonftrate that he has well confidered the fubject. In thefe differtations he is guilty of a small impropriety, common to writers of his nation, viz. intermixing modern and ancient terms; for example, in his description of the battle of Pidna*, he fays, the Conful ordered his first lines to feparate by platoon, ufing the word platoon for maniple: not confidering that a platoon contains a different portion of a battalion in different fervices, and has at different periods varied in the faid fervice; among the French he fays it is an eighth; in the English corps it has been a twelfth; but is now a fixteenth of the battalion. A maniple, according to his eftimation, answers to our fubdivifion, and is therefore equal to two platoons.

In chapter the 5th, our Author treats of the fhouts of the ancients, and their inftruments of military mufic, which he calls inftruments of war. Under this article he makes the following obfervation, by which he appears to be well versed in the operations of the human mind; a confideration, in our opinion, not fufficiently attended to by Tactitians, as it will, on examination, be found to have a much greater fhare in military matters, than is generally conceived or provided for.

Fought between the Romans, under Paulus Æmylius, and the Macedonians under Perfes.

• Though

Though the ftep of the Romans was not only regulated, but animated, by the found of warlike inftruments, they thought the fhout neceffary at the moment of their falling on the enemy. As they charged running, the rapidity of their motion, joined to the noise of their own fhouts, and of the trumpets and horns, inflamed them, and filled them with a fort of fury, which their leaders nevertheless knew how to moderate by the exactness of their difcipline. This people, whose whole thoughts were engroffed by war, had too well ftudied the nature of the human heart, not to be fenfible that mankind in general stood in need of fomething to warm them to action, and to ftun them in a manner with regard to danger. It is for this reafon the King of Pruffia trains his infantry to fire while marching, and that, with as much quickness as poffible. It must not be imagined, that all he aims at is to destroy great numbers of the enemy by the fire of his musketry; he knows too well that battles are not gained by fuch means; his view is to keep the foldier employed, and thereby fifle all reflection in him. Perhaps, too, to confound an enemy, ftupid enough to be frightened at his formidable fire, and not to dare either to attack or wait for him.'

The different orders of battle adopted by the most celebrated generals of antiquity, with fimilar difpofitions of more modern date, make a very interefting part of this work, and form a commentary on the feven models for orders of battle laid down by Vegetius, reducible, according to the opinion of the Author, to two, the parallel and oblique; thefe difpofitions, movements, and circumftances of ground, are clearly defcribed, and also illuftrated by well-conceived plans.

In the course of this fubject we meet with many curious particulars and judicious remarks, among them the following, which points out the cause of that fuccefs commonly attendant on an attacking army.

Nothing is found to intimidate troops more than the fight of an army marching to them, being in that cafe obliged to view the impending danger, leifurely and coolly, and their fears muft augment in proportion as the enemy advances to them; whereas, when they are put in motion, they lofe fight of the danger, their blood grows warm, and their courage takes fire.'

The fame fubject is thus farther illuftrated, under the head of armies in pofis, entrenched camps, and lines. Thefe examples, and I could bring many more, are fufficient proof of the infinite advantage affailants, merely as fuch, muft always have over those they attack, and the fuperiority they thereby acquire. This fuperiority may be derived from two caufes, the first a phyfical one, viz. that air of boldnefs, peculiar to affailants, cannot but aftonish and intimidate an enemy who fees that no difficulty can ftop them; the second is, that the affailants can command as much time as they pleafe, to take their measures for overcoming all obftacles that can be thrown in their way.'

Under