Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 284
... Sorensen ( who has sought to gain political office on his record as a participant on the Kennedy team and his close personal ties with the Ken- nedy brothers ) . My only solution to the problem of subtle distortions and biased reporting ...
... Sorensen ( who has sought to gain political office on his record as a participant on the Kennedy team and his close personal ties with the Ken- nedy brothers ) . My only solution to the problem of subtle distortions and biased reporting ...
Page 311
... Sorensen , 332 . " the nearest . . . to write " : This statement from the New York Times is quoted on the cover of the Bantam Book edition of Sorensen's Kennedy ( 1966 ) . " How could . . . same question " : Sorensen , 346 . " Kennedy ...
... Sorensen , 332 . " the nearest . . . to write " : This statement from the New York Times is quoted on the cover of the Bantam Book edition of Sorensen's Kennedy ( 1966 ) . " How could . . . same question " : Sorensen , 346 . " Kennedy ...
Page 318
... Sorensen , 770 . Major criteria for sound decision - making : See the discussion of defective decision- making in Chapter 1 , pp . 9-10 . 134 " the President . . . impossible " : Schlesinger , 803 . 136 " If Eisenhower . . . dangerous ...
... Sorensen , 770 . Major criteria for sound decision - making : See the discussion of defective decision- making in Chapter 1 , pp . 9-10 . 134 " the President . . . impossible " : Schlesinger , 803 . 136 " If Eisenhower . . . dangerous ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco forces group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Navy group Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group Wohlstetter