Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 45
... accept a taboo against voicing critical opposition ? A few clues permit some conjectures to be made , although we have much less evidence to go on than for delineating the pattern of preferential treatment itself . It seems that Allen ...
... accept a taboo against voicing critical opposition ? A few clues permit some conjectures to be made , although we have much less evidence to go on than for delineating the pattern of preferential treatment itself . It seems that Allen ...
Page 69
... accept opposing views of his advisers and to be influenced by them . During the first week of the Korean crisis , for example , Truman was responsive to his advisers ' objections to his strong preference to accept an offer from Chiang ...
... accept opposing views of his advisers and to be influenced by them . During the first week of the Korean crisis , for example , Truman was responsive to his advisers ' objections to his strong preference to accept an offer from Chiang ...
Page 89
... accepting the implications of any new in- formation that could challenge the group's preferred course of action . Naval officers who did not accept the invulnerability myth The assumption that the Japanese would never dare attack the ...
... accepting the implications of any new in- formation that could challenge the group's preferred course of action . Naval officers who did not accept the invulnerability myth The assumption that the Japanese would never dare attack the ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco forces group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Navy group Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group Wohlstetter