Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
From inside the book
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Page 17
... asked to attend all the White House meetings on the invasion plan , and Richard Goodwin , another Har- vard man " of uncommon intelligence . " Goodwin did not attend the policy- making meetings but was informed about the invasion plan ...
... asked to attend all the White House meetings on the invasion plan , and Richard Goodwin , another Har- vard man " of uncommon intelligence . " Goodwin did not attend the policy- making meetings but was informed about the invasion plan ...
Page 22
... asked the CIA planners if the members of the Cuban exile brigade were willing to risk their lives without United States military participation . The President and his advisers were given a strong af- firmative answer , and Dulles and ...
... asked the CIA planners if the members of the Cuban exile brigade were willing to risk their lives without United States military participation . The President and his advisers were given a strong af- firmative answer , and Dulles and ...
Page 24
... asked to estimate the chances of an invasion's being supported by the resistance move- ment or by popular uprisings behind the lines . Nor were any of the experts on the Cuban desk of the State Department , who kept a daily surveillance ...
... asked to estimate the chances of an invasion's being supported by the resistance move- ment or by popular uprisings behind the lines . Nor were any of the experts on the Cuban desk of the State Department , who kept a daily surveillance ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco forces group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Navy group Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group Wohlstetter