Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 73
at that dinner party on the eve of the attack and at the daily conferences held by
Admiral Kimmel during the preceding weeks : “ The prevalent opinion in the Fleet
among the higher command , ” he stated , “ . . . was that the situation permitted of
...
at that dinner party on the eve of the attack and at the daily conferences held by
Admiral Kimmel during the preceding weeks : “ The prevalent opinion in the Fleet
among the higher command , ” he stated , “ . . . was that the situation permitted of
...
Page 85
So far as their own base was concerned , these two officers , like everyone else
in the Navy group , were convinced that the Pacific Fleet concentrated at Pearl
Harbor was a major deterrent against an enemy air or naval attack . The fleet was
...
So far as their own base was concerned , these two officers , like everyone else
in the Navy group , were convinced that the Pacific Fleet concentrated at Pearl
Harbor was a major deterrent against an enemy air or naval attack . The fleet was
...
Page 93
The recipients of the official war warnings of November 24 and 27 , sensitized to
words that fit in with their relatively placid assumptions , noted that a number of
possible targets for a Japanese attack were listed — the Philippines , Guam ...
The recipients of the official war warnings of November 24 and 27 , sensitized to
words that fit in with their relatively placid assumptions , noted that a number of
possible targets for a Japanese attack were listed — the Philippines , Guam ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact factors feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman invasion involved issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House