Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 69
... objections to his strong preference to accept an offer from Chiang Kai - shek to send thirty- three thousand Chinese ... objections and others in the group , instead of bolstering the Presi- dent's inclinations , voiced additional ...
... objections to his strong preference to accept an offer from Chiang Kai - shek to send thirty- three thousand Chinese ... objections and others in the group , instead of bolstering the Presi- dent's inclinations , voiced additional ...
Page 182
... objections was that even if the military mission succeeded in rescuing all fifty American hostages held in the U.S. Embassy and the three others held at a distant building in the Foreign Ministry , Iranian militants could retaliate by ...
... objections was that even if the military mission succeeded in rescuing all fifty American hostages held in the U.S. Embassy and the three others held at a distant building in the Foreign Ministry , Iranian militants could retaliate by ...
Page 283
... objections at a formal meeting of his large group of advisers , he did not give the group an opportunity to discuss the objections that were being raised . Instead , he immediately called for a vote on the CIA plan . This was the ...
... objections at a formal meeting of his large group of advisers , he did not give the group an opportunity to discuss the objections that were being raised . Instead , he immediately called for a vote on the CIA plan . This was the ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco forces group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Navy group Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group Wohlstetter