Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 93
They believed it meant that the government leaders agreed with their assumption
that there was no chance at all of a Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor , that
the only threats to be considered were minor ones — a sabotage attempt by a ...
They believed it meant that the government leaders agreed with their assumption
that there was no chance at all of a Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor , that
the only threats to be considered were minor ones — a sabotage attempt by a ...
Page 137
... relying upon the traditional methods of diplomacy and accommodation to
negotiate with the Soviet Union and with the Castro government , President
Kennedy might have succeeded in finding a way not only to eliminate the missile
threat but ...
... relying upon the traditional methods of diplomacy and accommodation to
negotiate with the Soviet Union and with the Castro government , President
Kennedy might have succeeded in finding a way not only to eliminate the missile
threat but ...
Page 155
really meant what they had been saying about their limited but nonnegotiable
demand to withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba . They asked themselves how
this could be communicated as a positive move toward peace , not as a threat .
really meant what they had been saying about their limited but nonnegotiable
demand to withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba . They asked themselves how
this could be communicated as a positive move toward peace , not as a threat .
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact factors feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman invasion involved issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House