Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 321
( These include the transcript for September 15 , 1972 , and the following
transcripts during 1973 : February , 28 , March 13 , March 21 A.M. and P.M. ,
March 22 P.M. , April 16 A.M. and P.m. ) The others were prepared by
Department of Justice ...
( These include the transcript for September 15 , 1972 , and the following
transcripts during 1973 : February , 28 , March 13 , March 21 A.M. and P.M. ,
March 22 P.M. , April 16 A.M. and P.m. ) The others were prepared by
Department of Justice ...
Page 323
I was not prepared ... collegially received " : Ibid . , 134-135 . Gray was expected
to be “ one hundred percent loyal ... " : Haldeman , 300 . Dean was “ furious at
Gray ” : Dean , 212 . " He may be dead ... shoot him ” : Transcript , March 22 ,
1973 .
I was not prepared ... collegially received " : Ibid . , 134-135 . Gray was expected
to be “ one hundred percent loyal ... " : Haldeman , 300 . Dean was “ furious at
Gray ” : Dean , 212 . " He may be dead ... shoot him ” : Transcript , March 22 ,
1973 .
Page 324
222 223 223 223 223 223 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 225 225 225 226 226
227 227 227 227 227 228 “ What are your feelings ... options " and " soft spots ”
and “ not confident that we can ride through this ” : Transcript , March 21 , 1973.
222 223 223 223 223 223 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 225 225 225 226 226
227 227 227 227 227 228 “ What are your feelings ... options " and " soft spots ”
and “ not confident that we can ride through this ” : Transcript , March 21 , 1973.
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Contents
The Wrong | 3 |
The Making of the Marshall Plan | 159 |
How Clever | 198 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
accepted according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact factors feel fiasco forces give going groupthink Haldeman invasion involved issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United UNIVERSITY Vietnam warning Watergate White House