Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
From inside the book
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Page 138
... Soviet ships , forced several Soviet submarines to surface near the quarantine zone , and actually did board a Lebanese vessel chartered by the Soviet Union . These actions were calculated to postpone a direct military confrontation ...
... Soviet ships , forced several Soviet submarines to surface near the quarantine zone , and actually did board a Lebanese vessel chartered by the Soviet Union . These actions were calculated to postpone a direct military confrontation ...
Page 153
... Soviet leaders as basically reasonable men , who could be convinced to withdraw their missiles . Without denying the cunning and deceit of the Soviet leaders , the group adopted the working assumption that the Soviet Union would not be ...
... Soviet leaders as basically reasonable men , who could be convinced to withdraw their missiles . Without denying the cunning and deceit of the Soviet leaders , the group adopted the working assumption that the Soviet Union would not be ...
Page 154
... Soviet - owned vessel , it did not represent a direct affront to the Soviets requir- ing a response from them . " In this way , as Roger Hilsman ( the Director of In- telligence in the State Department ) observed , ample time was ...
... Soviet - owned vessel , it did not represent a direct affront to the Soviets requir- ing a response from them . " In this way , as Roger Hilsman ( the Director of In- telligence in the State Department ) observed , ample time was ...
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Common terms and phrases
Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group