Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
From inside the book
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Page 80
... Wohlstetter's main point is that along with the crucial military warning signals , there were large numbers of competing and irrelevant signals . This background " noise , " as Wohlstetter calls it , often gave a confused picture and ...
... Wohlstetter's main point is that along with the crucial military warning signals , there were large numbers of competing and irrelevant signals . This background " noise , " as Wohlstetter calls it , often gave a confused picture and ...
Page 81
... Wohlstetter : The history of Pearl Harbor has an interest exceeding by far any tale of an isolated catastrophe that might have been the result of negligence or stupidity or treachery , however lurid . For we have found the roots of this ...
... Wohlstetter : The history of Pearl Harbor has an interest exceeding by far any tale of an isolated catastrophe that might have been the result of negligence or stupidity or treachery , however lurid . For we have found the roots of this ...
Page 334
... Wohlstetter , A. , and Wohlstetter , R. Controlling the risks in Cuba . Adelphi Papers , No. 17 , Institute of Strategic Studies , London , April 1965 . Wong - McCarthy , W. A content analysis of the unedited White House transcripts ...
... Wohlstetter , A. , and Wohlstetter , R. Controlling the risks in Cuba . Adelphi Papers , No. 17 , Institute of Strategic Studies , London , April 1965 . Wong - McCarthy , W. A content analysis of the unedited White House transcripts ...
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Common terms and phrases
Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group