Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 126
What Johnson leaves out of his account is that United States negotiations with
Polish officials continued for more than a week after the first scheduled meeting
date and that while those meetings were going on the United States launched
two ...
What Johnson leaves out of his account is that United States negotiations with
Polish officials continued for more than a week after the first scheduled meeting
date and that while those meetings were going on the United States launched
two ...
Page 138
The crisis continued for another eight days , and the same group continued to
meet daily until the crisis was finally resolved by Khrushchev's offer to withdraw
the missiles . On October 22 , President Kennedy gave his dramatic speech ...
The crisis continued for another eight days , and the same group continued to
meet daily until the crisis was finally resolved by Khrushchev's offer to withdraw
the missiles . On October 22 , President Kennedy gave his dramatic speech ...
Page 213
Dean continued to be highly regarded as having the right stuff by his superiors
during the next six months . In February 1973 , Nixon , Haldeman , and
Ehrlichman agreed that Dean should have more direct contact with the President
. Initially ...
Dean continued to be highly regarded as having the right stuff by his superiors
during the next six months . In February 1973 , Nixon , Haldeman , and
Ehrlichman agreed that Dean should have more direct contact with the President
. Initially ...
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Contents
The Wrong | 3 |
The Making of the Marshall Plan | 159 |
How Clever | 198 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
accepted according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact factors feel fiasco forces give going groupthink Haldeman invasion involved issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United UNIVERSITY Vietnam warning Watergate White House